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__________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
In 2008 this Court handed down the seminal case of In 
re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation, 552 F.3d 305 (3d 
Cir. 2008), which outlines the standards a district court should 
apply in deciding whether to certify a class. This appeal by 
Comcast requires us to decide if the District Court for the 
4 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania properly satisfied 
Hydrogen‘s directions in determining that questions of fact or 
law common to class members predominate sufficiently to 
satisfy Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Appellants contend that the District Court exceeded a proper 
exercise of discretion and that its findings of fact were clearly 
erroneous. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the Court 
did not exceed its permissible discretion in determining that 
Plaintiffs established by a preponderance of evidence that 
they would be able to prove through common evidence (1) 
class-wide antitrust impact (higher cost on non-basic cable 
programming), and (2) a common methodology to quantify 
damages on a class-wide basis. Accordingly, we will affirm.  
 
I. 
 
A. 
 
―For the rational study of the law the black-
letter man may be the man of the present, but 
the man of the future is the man of statistics and 
the master of economics.‖ 
 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the 
Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897). 
 
Beginning in 1998, Defendants Comcast Corporation, 
Comcast Holdings Corporation, Comcast Cable 
Communications, Inc., Comcast Cable Communications 
Holdings, Inc., and Comcast Cable Holdings, LLC 
(collectively ―Comcast‖) engaged in a series of transactions 
that increased Comcast‘s share of the multichannel video 
programming distribution services offered in the Philadelphia 
5 
Designated Market Area (―Philadelphia DMA‖).1 Comcast 
contracted with competing cable providers to either acquire 
them or to ―swap‖ cable systems it owned in areas outside the 
Philadelphia DMA for cable systems within the Philadelphia 
DMA. These transactions form the ―Cable System 
Transactions,‖ involving the ―Transaction parties.‖2 As a 
                                              
1
 ―A DMA is a specific media research area that is used by 
Nielsen Media Research to identify television stations whose 
broadcast signals reach a specific area and attract the most 
viewers. DMA boundaries are widely accepted and used by 
all types of companies to target and keep track of 
advertising.‖ Steak n Shake Co. v. Burger King Corp., 323 F. 
Supp. 2d 983, 986 n.2 (E.D. Mo. 2004). 
2
 The District Court set forth the Cable System Transactions: 
 The April 1998 acquisition of Marcus Cable and its 
27,000 cable subscribers located in Harrington, 
Delaware, which is part of the Philadelphia DMA.  
 The June 1999 acquisition of Greater Philadelphia 
Cablevision, Inc., a subsidiary of Greater Media, Inc., 
and its 79,000 cable subscribers located in 
Philadelphia.  
 The January 2000 acquisition of Lenfest 
Communications, Inc. and more than 1.1 million cable 
subscribers located in Berks, Bucks, Chester, 
Delaware, and Montgomery counties in Pennsylvania, 
and New Castle County in Delaware.  
 The January 2000 acquisition of Lenfest‘s ownership 
interests in Garden State Cablevision L.P. and its 
212,000 customers located in Atlantic, Burlington, 
Camden, Cape May, Cumberland, Gloucester, Mercer, 
and Salem counties in New Jersey, which is part of the 
Philadelphia DMA. 
6 
result of the Cable System Transactions, Comcast‘s share of 
subscribers in the Philadelphia DMA allegedly increased 
from 23.9 percent in 1998 to 77.8 percent by 2002, settling at 
69.5 percent in 2007. See Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 264 
                                                                                                     
 The December 2000 swap agreement with AT & T, 
wherein Comcast obtained cable systems and 
approximately 770,000 subscribers, including 
subscribers located in Eastern Pennsylvania (Berks and 
Bucks counties) and New Jersey. In exchange, AT & T 
obtained cable systems and approximately 700,000 
Comcast subscribers located in Chicago and elsewhere 
around the country.  
 The January 2001 swap agreement with Adelphia 
Communications Corp., wherein Comcast obtained 
cable systems and approximately 464,000 subscribers 
located primarily in the Philadelphia area and adjacent 
New Jersey areas. In exchange, Adelphia received 
Comcast‘s cable systems and subscribers located in 
Palm Beach, Florida and Los Angeles, California.  
 The April 2001 swap agreement with AT & T, wherein 
Comcast obtained cable systems and approximately 
595,000 subscribers, including subscribers located in 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey.  
 The August 2006 swap agreement with Time Warner 
in connection with the Adelphia bankruptcy, wherein 
Comcast obtained cable systems and approximately 
41,000 subscribers in the Philadelphia DMA.  
 The August 2007 acquisition of Patriot Media and its 
81,000 cable subscribers located in New Jersey, within 
the Philadelphia DMA. 
Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 264 F.R.D. 150, 156 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 
2010). 
7 
F.R.D. 150, 160 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (setting forth Plaintiffs‘ 
expert‘s calculations as to Comcast‘s market share). 
 
Plaintiffs, six non-basic cable television programming 
services customers of Comcast, brought a class action 
antitrust suit against Comcast in 2003. They alleged 
violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, for 
―imposing horizontal territory, market and customer 
allocations by conspiring with and entering into and 
implementing unlawful swap agreements, arrangements or 
devices,‖ and section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, on 
theories of monopolization and attempted monopolization.
3
 
App. 00232-243 (Third Am. Compl.). The Complaint alleged 
anticompetitive conduct in the Philadelphia area and the 
Chicago area. As only the alleged conduct in Philadelphia is 
before us, we focus on the nature of the class and the 
allegations in Philadelphia. 
 
The proposed class included: ―All cable television 
customers who subscribe or subscribed at any time since 
December 1, 1999, to the present to video programming 
services (other than solely to basic cable services) from 
Comcast, or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates in Comcast‘s 
                                              
3
 Section 1 of the Sherman Act states: ―Every contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.‖ 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
Section 2 states: ―Every person who shall monopolize, or 
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other 
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, 
shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .‖ Id. § 2. 
8 
Philadelphia cluster.‖ App. 00217; see id. (excluding from the 
class ―governmental entities, Defendants, Defendants‘ 
subsidiaries and affiliates and this Court‖). The Philadelphia 
cluster is composed ―of the areas covered by Comcast‘s cable 
franchises, or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates, located in 
the following counties: Berks, Bucks, Chester, Delaware, 
Montgomery and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Kent and New 
Castle, Delaware; and Atlantic, Burlington, Camden, Cape 
May, Cumberland, Gloucester, Mercer and Salem, New 
Jersey.‖ See Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 191.4 
 
The Complaint alleged that Comcast had perpetrated 
an anticompetitive ―clustering scheme.‖ To clarify its 
contentions we pause to define two key terms. ―Clustering‖ 
refers to a ―strategy whereby cable [Multi-System Operators 
(―MSOs‖)] concentrate their operations in regional 
geographic areas by acquiring cable systems in regions where 
the MSO already has a significant presence, while giving up 
other holdings scattered across the country. This strategy is 
accomplished through purchases and sales of cable systems, 
or by system ‗swapping‘ among MSOs.‖ Implementation of 
the Cable Television Consumer Prot. & Competition Act of 
1992, 22 F.C.C. Rcd. 17791, 17810 n.134 (2007) (citation 
omitted). An ―overbuilder‖ is a company that builds and 
offers customers a competitive alternative where a 
telecommunications company already operates. According to 
the Complaint, Comcast eliminated competition by (1) 
acquiring competitors in the Philadelphia market and 
                                              
4
 The ―Philadelphia cluster‖ and the ―Philadelphia DMA‖ are 
separate terms. The Philadelphia DMA includes the cluster 
counties as well as the counties of Lehigh and Northampton, 
Pennsylvania. See App. 03614, 03795. 
9 
(2) swapping with competitors cable systems and subscribers 
outside of the Philadelphia market for cable systems and 
subscribers within the Philadelphia market. The Complaint 
also alleged that Comcast engaged in conduct intended to 
exclude competition from overbuilder RCN Telecom 
Services, Inc. (―RCN‖), by denying it access to ―Comcast 
Sportsnet,‖ requiring contractors to enter non-compete 
agreements, and inducing potential customers to sign up for 
long contracts with special discounts and penalty provisions 
in the areas where RCN intended to overbuild. App. 00235-
239. 
 
As a result of its clustering, Comcast allegedly harmed 
the class by eliminating competition, raising entry barriers to 
potential competition, maintaining increased prices for cable 
services at supra-competitive levels, and depriving 
subscribers of the lower prices that would result from 
effective competition. App. 00241-242. In other words, 
Comcast subscribers allegedly pay too much for their non-
basic video programming cable service. 
 
B. 
 
On May 3, 2007, after extensive motions practice, see 
App. 00148-172 (listing 194 docket entries prior to 
certification), the District Court certified the proposed class. 
App. 00354. It determined that Plaintiffs had met the 
requirements of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (numerosity, commonality, typicality, and 
adequacy). App. 00366-372. It held also that Plaintiffs had 
met the predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 
23(b). App. 00373-387. We denied on June 29, 2007, 
Comcast‘s 23(f) petition seeking interlocutory review. 
10 
 
The Court also certified the Chicago class‘s claims, but 
stayed them pending the outcome of the Philadelphia class. 
App. 00177, 00179.
5
 
 
Following our decision in Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 
F.3d 305, the District Court granted in part Comcast‘s motion 
to reconsider its Philadelphia certification decision (the Court 
denied without prejudice consideration of the Chicago class 
certification, again pending the outcome in Philadelphia). 
App. 00437-439. It vacated only the portion of the 
certification decision that addressed Rule 23(b)‘s 
predominance requirement. The Court scheduled a hearing on 
the issue of predominance as it related to (1) antitrust impact, 
and (2) methodology of damages. 
 
The District Court held an evidentiary hearing on 
October 13-15 and 26, 2009. During the four-day hearing, the 
Court heard live testimony from fact and expert witnesses, 
considered 32 expert reports, and examined deposition 
excerpts, as well as many other documents. Following the 
hearing, the Court issued to the parties a series of questions 
related to antitrust impact and damages methodology, and 
heard argument on November 16, 2009, to address its specific 
questions. 
 
                                              
5
 Plaintiffs‘ counsel also filed a complaint in the District of 
Massachusetts on behalf of a ―Boston cluster.‖ That case was 
transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and has 
been stayed pending resolution of the Chicago cluster claims. 
See App. 00179. 
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On January 7, 2010, the District Court recertified the 
Philadelphia class, and issued an amended class certification 
order on January 13, 2010. The Court reaffirmed and 
incorporated its May 2007 certification as to numerosity, 
commonality, typicality, and adequacy (Rule 23(a)), as well 
as superiority (Rule 23(b)(3)). App. 00029. On the disputed 
issue of predominance, the Court held that Plaintiffs had 
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) 
questions of law and fact common to the members of the class 
predominated; (2) the relevant geographic market could be 
the Philadelphia Designated Market Area; (3) the class could 
establish antitrust impact on the theory that Comcast‘s 
clustering through the swaps and acquisitions deterred 
overbuilder competition; (4) the models and analyses of 
Plaintiffs‘ damages expert, Dr. James McClave, were 
common evidence available to measure and quantify damages 
on a class-wide basis; and (5) the class could establish 
antitrust impact through common evidence applicable to all 
class members. App. 00030. In certifying the class, however, 
the District Court narrowed the class‘s various theories of 
class-wide impact to a single theory: 
 
Proof of antitrust impact relative to such claims 
shall be limited to the theory that Comcast 
engaged in anticompetitive clustering conduct, 
the effect of which was to deter the entry of 
overbuilders in the Philadelphia DMA. 
 
App. 00032. 
 
The Court accompanied its order with an 81-page 
memorandum opinion containing its analysis of the evidence 
presented at the evidentiary hearing. Behrend v. Comcast 
12 
Corp., 264 F.R.D. 150 (E.D. Pa. 2010). The Court 
summarized its opinion as follows: 
 
Having rigorously analyzed the expert reports, 
as well as the testimony presented by the parties 
during a four-day evidentiary hearing, we 
conclude that the class has met its burden to 
demonstrate that the element of antitrust impact 
is capable of proof at trial through evidence that 
is common to the class rather than individual to 
its members, and that there is a common 
methodology available to measure and quantify 
damages on a class-wide basis. 
 
Id. at 154.  
 
 Comcast filed a Rule 23(f) petition to appeal on 
January 27, 2010. While that petition was pending, Comcast 
moved for summary judgment. The class responded, and 
Comcast filed a reply on June 4, 2010. We granted Comcast 
permission to appeal on June 9, 2010. The motion for 
summary judgment remains pending in the District Court. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) and Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
 
 ―We review a class certification order for abuse of 
discretion, which occurs if the district court‘s decision rests 
upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion 
13 
of law or an improper application of law to fact.‖ Hydrogen 
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 312 (citation and quotations omitted). 
We review de novo whether an incorrect legal standard has 
been used. Id. (citation omitted). 
 
For a district court‘s finding of fact to be clearly 
erroneous, the standard is high. ―Clearly erroneous‖ has been 
interpreted to mean that a reviewing court can upset a finding 
of fact, even if there is some evidence to support the finding, 
only if the court is ―left with the definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been committed.‖ United States v. U.S. 
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). This means that ―[i]t 
is the responsibility of an appellate court to accept the 
ultimate factual determination of the fact-finder unless that 
determination either (1) is completely devoid of minimum 
evidentiary support displaying some hue of credibility, or (2) 
bears no rational relationship to the supportive evidentiary 
data.‖ Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1302 (3d Cir. 1972). 
Especially pertinent to the issue before us, the Supreme Court 
has explained: 
 
This standard plainly does not entitle a 
reviewing court to reverse the finding of the 
trier of fact simply because it is convinced that 
it would have decided the case differently. . . . 
In applying the clearly erroneous standard to the 
findings of a district court sitting without a jury, 
appellate courts must constantly have in mind 
that their function is not to decide factual issues 
de novo. If the district court‘s account of the 
evidence is plausible in light of the record 
viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may 
not reverse it even though convinced that had it 
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been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have 
weighed the evidence differently. Where there 
are two permissible views of the evidence, the 
factfinder‘s choice between them cannot be 
clearly erroneous. 
 
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-574 (1985) 
(quotations and citations omitted); accord PA Prison Soc‘y v. 
Cortes, 622 F.3d 215, 231 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 
III. 
 
Comcast raises three principal arguments on appeal, 
urging us to overturn the District Court‘s certification order 
on the grounds that: (1) the Court‘s finding that the class can 
establish class-wide antitrust impact through common 
evidence was incorrect for various reasons; (2) the District 
Court exceeded its discretion in accepting Plaintiffs‘ proposed 
methodology for damages calculation; and (3) the Court‘s 
certification of a per se antitrust claim was clear error. In 
response, Plaintiffs defend in all respects the District Court‘s 
certification decision. We first outline the Rule 23 legal 
framework and then analyze each of Comcast‘s contentions. 
 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows 
a class action if certain requirements are met. First, the class 
must meet the ―prerequisites‖ of Rule 23(a): numerosity, 
commonality, typicality, and adequacy. Second, the class 
must fit one of the Rule 23(b) types of classes. Here, 
Plaintiffs seek certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which 
requires (1) ―that the questions of law or fact common to class 
members predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual members,‖ and (2) ―that a class action is superior 
15 
to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 
adjudicating the controversy.‖ Rule 23(b)(3). These 
requirements are known as predominance and superiority. 
 
The district court must conduct a ―rigorous analysis‖ 
of the evidence and arguments in making the class 
certification decision. Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 318. 
The analysis requires ―a thorough examination of the factual 
and legal allegations‖ and ―may include a preliminary inquiry 
into the merits.‖ Id. at 317 (quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 166, 168 (3d Cir. 
2001)). We explained in Hydrogen Peroxide the permissible 
extent of any inquiry into the merits: 
 
[T]he requirements set out in Rule 23 are not 
mere pleading rules. The court may delve 
beyond the pleadings to determine whether the 
requirements for class certification are satisfied. 
. . . An overlap between a class certification 
requirement and the merits of a claim is no 
reason to decline to resolve relevant disputes 
when necessary to determine whether a class 
certification requirement is met. Some 
uncertainty ensued when the Supreme Court 
declared in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 
U.S. 156, 177 (1974), that there is ―nothing in 
either the language or history of Rule 23 that 
gives a court any authority to conduct a 
preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in 
order to determine whether it may be 
maintained as a class action.‖ Only a few years 
later, in addressing whether a party may bring 
an interlocutory appeal when a district court 
16 
denies class certification, the Supreme Court 
pointed out that ―the class determination 
generally involves considerations that are 
‗enmeshed in the factual and legal issues 
comprising the plaintiff‘s cause of action.‘‖ 
[Coopers & Lybrand v.] Livesay, 437 U.S. 
[463,] 469 [(1978)] (quoting Mercantile Nat‘l 
Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558 (1963)). 
As we explained in Newton, 259 F.3d at 166-
69, Eisen is best understood to preclude only a 
merits inquiry that is not necessary to determine 
a Rule 23 requirement. Other courts of appeals 
have agreed. 
 
552 F.3d at 316-317 (quotations and citations omitted).
6
 
Accordingly, at the class certification stage, we are precluded 
from addressing any merits inquiry unnecessary to making a 
Rule 23 determination. Id. Further, any findings for the 
purpose of class certification ―do not bind the fact-finder on 
the merits.‖ Id. at 318. 
 
Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing each element 
of Rule 23 by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 320 
(―[T]o certify a class the district court must find that the 
evidence more likely than not establishes each fact necessary 
to meet the requirements of Rule 23.‖) (citation omitted). The 
                                              
6
 The Supreme Court confirmed our interpretation of the Rule 
23 inquiry in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 
(2011). See id. at 2551, 2552 n.6 (stating that ―[f]requently 
[the Rule 23] ‗rigorous analysis‘ will entail some overlap with 
the merits of the plaintiff‘s underlying claim,‖ but Eisen still 
prohibits ―a merits inquiry for any other pretrial purpose‖). 
17 
court must also examine critically expert testimony on both 
sides and may be persuaded by either side as to whether a 
certification requirement has been met. Id. at 323. Indeed, 
―[w]eighing conflicting expert testimony at the certification 
stage is not only permissible; it may be integral to the 
rigorous analysis Rule 23 demands.‖ Id. 
 
The parties dispute whether Plaintiffs have met the 
predominance requirement. Predominance ―tests whether 
proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant 
adjudication by representation.‖ Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997). It ―is a test readily met in 
certain cases alleging consumer or securities fraud or 
violations of the antitrust laws,‖ id. at 625, but a court may 
not relax its certification analysis as to each element of Rule 
23, see Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 322. To assess 
whether common or individual issues predominate, a district 
court must examine the nature of the evidence and ―formulate 
some prediction as to how specific issues will play out . . . .‖ 
Id. at 311 (quotations and citations omitted). 
 
Reviewing a district court‘s certification of a class, we 
examine the elements of the class‘s claims ―through the 
prism‖ of Rule 23. Id. (quoting Newton, 259 F.3d at 181). 
The elements of the claims before us are (1) a violation of the 
antitrust laws (here, sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act), (2) 
individual injury resulting from that violation, and (3) 
measurable damages. See id. Individual injury, also known as 
antitrust impact, ―is critically important for the purpose of 
evaluating Rule 23(b)(3)‘s predominance requirement 
because it is an element of the claim that may call for 
individual, as opposed to common, proof.‖ Id. At the class 
certification stage, Plaintiffs‘ burden is ―to demonstrate that 
18 
the element of antitrust impact is capable of proof at trial 
through evidence that is common to the class rather than 
individual to its members.‖ Id. at 311-312. 
 
IV. 
 
Comcast devotes much of its energy to contending that 
the District Court exceeded its discretion in holding that 
Plaintiffs had established common evidence of antitrust 
impact. It attacks this issue in two ways: first, that the District 
Court failed to apply the correct legal standard for 
determining the relevant geographic market, and, second, that 
the District Court made clearly erroneous factual findings by 
relying on Plaintiffs‘ expert for proof of class-wide antitrust 
impact. We address each contention in turn. 
 
A. 
 
Before the District Court, Plaintiffs contended that the 
relevant geographic market was the Philadelphia Designated 
Market Area, whereas Comcast countered that it was each 
individual‘s household. The District Court agreed with 
Plaintiffs. Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 160. Plaintiffs‘ expert, Dr. 
Michael Williams, provided seven bases to support the 
conclusion that the relevant geographic market was the 
Philadelphia DMA. The District Court set forth each basis, as 
well as Comcast‘s counterarguments. 264 F.R.D. at 157-160. 
The Court stated that Comcast‘s focus on the individual 
household was not supported by the record, and that setting 
such a small market would be ―impractical and inefficient.‖ 
264 F.R.D. at 160. Instead, the Court noted that the alleged 
conduct centered on Comcast‘s attempt to acquire 
substantially all of the cable systems in the Philadelphia 
19 
DMA, and that the Federal Communications Commission 
aggregates relevant geographic markets in which customers 
face ―similar competitive choices.‖ 264 F.R.D. at 160. The 
Court concluded, ―[T]he record evidence shows that 
consumers throughout the DMA can face similar competitive 
choices and suffer the same alleged antitrust impact resulting 
from Comcast‘s clustering conduct in the Philadelphia 
DMA.‖ 264 F.R.D. at 160. 
 
Comcast contends that the Court failed to articulate or 
apply the correct legal standard. According to Comcast, the 
geographic market is defined in terms of consumer demand 
substitutability—the area in which a buyer may look for the 
goods or services he seeks. Because an individual can choose 
only among providers offering video programming services to 
his household, Comcast asserts that the geographic market 
must be the household. Comcast contends additionally that 
the Court improperly credited Dr. Williams‘s seven bases for 
the geographic market because it later rejected three of the 
seven theories, and that the Court‘s two stated reasons for 
accepting the geographic market were irrelevant and 
erroneous. 
 
Plaintiffs respond at three levels. First, they contend 
that they need not define the relevant geographic market: per 
se claims do not require defining the geographic market, and 
they offered direct evidence of market power, thereby 
relieving them of the obligation to define the relevant 
geographic market. Second, Plaintiffs state that the District 
Court used the commercial realities test to determine the 
relevant geographic market and did not ignore demand 
substitutability. Third, according to Plaintiffs, Comcast 
cannot demonstrate clear error in the Court‘s factual 
20 
determination that ―consumers throughout the [Philadelphia] 
DMA can face similar competitive choices.‖ See Behrend, 
264 F.R.D. at 160. 
 
B. 
 
We will affirm the District Court‘s conclusion that the 
Philadelphia DMA is a relevant geographic market 
―susceptible to proof at trial through available evidence 
common to the class.‖ 264 F.R.D. at 160. 
 
The relevant geographic market is a component of 
substantive antitrust law. For antitrust claims analyzed 
through the rule of reason, plaintiffs must demonstrate that 
the defendant possessed market power in the relevant 
geographic market. See Pa. Dental Ass‘n v. Med. Serv. Ass‘n 
of Pa., 745 F.2d 248, 260 (3d Cir. 1984). For per se claims, 
plaintiffs need not establish a geographic market. See In re 
Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 316-317 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (explaining that some prohibited practices can be 
conclusively presumed to unreasonably restrain competition). 
Additionally, ―direct proof of monopoly power does not 
require a definition of the relevant market.‖ See Broadcom 
Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 307 n.3 (3d Cir. 
2007). 
 
Defining the relevant geographic market, however, is 
an issue of the merits. See, e.g., Borough of Lansdale v. Phila. 
Elec. Co., 692 F.2d 307 (3d Cir. 1982) (addressing on appeal 
whether jury verdict should be set aside because of allegedly 
erroneous definition of relevant geographic market). At the 
class certification stage, a court need only be satisfied that 
issues—including the definition of a geographic market—will 
21 
be capable of proof through evidence common to the class. 
See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311; IIA Phillip E. 
Areeda et al., Antitrust Law ¶ 398b (3d ed. 2007) (describing 
that at the class certification stage the plaintiffs‘ expert 
typically concludes that ―any significant economic issues 
underlying the class representative‘s antitrust claims, 
including but not limited to issues regarding market definition 
. . . will be analyzed and proven through the use of common 
data and evidence that would be used to prove the claims of 
the other members of the proposed Class‖) (emphasis added). 
If the plaintiffs allege per se claims, they may still need to 
persuade the district court that, in the event defining the 
relevant geographic market becomes necessary, it is capable 
of common proof. See Areeda et al., supra, ¶ 398b. 
 
The inquiry before the District Court, therefore, was 
whether Plaintiffs could demonstrate by a preponderance of 
the evidence that they would be able to establish a relevant 
geographic market capable of proof common to the class. The 
District Court concluded it was: ―We conclude that Dr. 
Williams‘ geographic market definition is susceptible to proof 
at trial through available evidence common to the class.‖ 264 
F.R.D. at 160. The parties dispute whether the District Court 
properly defined the relevant geographic market—Comcast 
contends it erred as a matter of law, and Plaintiffs respond 
they need not establish a geographic market. These are merits 
arguments, which are not properly before us. Our review is 
limited to whether the Court exceeded its discretion in 
determining that the class could establish through common 
proof that the relevant geographic market could be the 
Philadelphia DMA. We conclude it did not, legally or 
factually. 
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C. 
 
First, we perceive no legal error in the District Court‘s 
reasoning. Procedurally, it conducted the required ―rigorous 
analysis‖ by examining in depth the expert opinions on both 
sides and setting forth its conclusions. See Hydrogen 
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 317, 320. Substantively, the Court 
determined that ―the record evidence shows that consumers 
throughout the DMA can face similar competitive choices 
and suffer the same alleged antitrust impact resulting from 
Comcast‘s clustering conduct in the Philadelphia DMA.‖ 264 
F.R.D. at 160. Comcast contends that the Court failed to 
apply the consumer demand substitutability test, which 
defines the relevant geographic market as ―that area in which 
a potential buyer may rationally look for the goods or services 
he seeks.‖ Gordon v. Lewiston Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 212 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (citing Pa. Dental Ass‘n, 745 F.2d at 260). We 
determine otherwise: the Court‘s analysis of the relevant 
geographic market for purposes of class certification 
comported with our precedent. 
 
―[I]dentification of the relevant geographic market is a 
matter of analyzing competition.‖ Borough of Lansdale v. 
Phila. Elec. Co., 692 F.2d 307, 311 (3d Cir. 1982). Defining it 
―is a question of fact to be determined in the context of each 
case in acknowledgment of the commercial realities of the 
industry being considered.‖ Gordon, 423 F.3d at 212 (quoting 
Borough of Lansdale, 692 F.2d at 311). In these decisions of 
our Court, one of which has commanded our attention for 
almost thirty years, we relied on two Supreme Court cases to 
develop this standard: United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 
U.S. 563, 576 (1966), which held that the relevant geographic 
market under the Sherman Act was ―not the several local 
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areas which the individual stations serve, but the broader 
national market that reflects the reality of the way in which 
they built and conduct their business,‖ and Tampa Electric 
Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327, 332 (1961), 
which defined the relevant geographic area for § 3 of the 
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3, as ―the market area in which the 
seller operates, and to which the purchaser can practicably 
turn for supplies‖ or as the area in which suppliers 
―effectively compete.‖ In another Clayton Act case, the 
Supreme Court stated: ―The geographic market selected must, 
therefore, both correspond to the commercial realities of the 
industry and be economically significant. Thus, although the 
geographic market in some instances may encompass the 
entire Nation, under other circumstances it may be as small as 
a single metropolitan area.‖ Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 
370 U.S. 294, 336-337 (1962) (quotations and citations 
omitted); see Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 572 (citing Brown Shoe as 
analogous to determining the relevant market for the Sherman 
Act). 
 
D. 
 
The District Court‘s determination—that consumers 
―face similar competitive choices‖ in the Philadelphia DMA 
as a result of Comcast‘s alleged clustering conduct—is 
consistent with the above standards because it considers both 
where a buyer may rationally look for goods and the 
commercial reality of the industry. Comcast‘s insistence that 
the geographic market must be the individual household (as 
the only place where a consumer can ―comparison shop‖) 
ignores that the geographic market must be ―economically 
significant,‖ Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 336-337, and may 
be premised on ―the commercial realities of the industry 
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being considered,‖ Borough of Lansdale, 692 F.2d at 311, the 
area where suppliers ―effectively compete,‖ Tampa Electric 
Co., 365 U.S. at 332, or the broader market reflecting the 
reality of conducting business, Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 576.
7
 We 
therefore discern no legal error in the District Court‘s 
analysis. 
 
E. 
 
                                              
7
 We note additionally the tension between the concept of a 
―geographic market‖ and Comcast‘s conclusion that ―the 
relevant geographic market . . . is each class member‘s 
residence.‖ Appellants‘ Br. 15. As of 2009, Philadelphia 
County alone had over 560,000 households. See U.S. Census 
Bureau, Philadelphia County QuickFacts, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/42/42101.html. 
Nationwide, in 2010 there were over 117 million households. 
See U.S. Census Bureau, America‘s Families and Living 
Arrangements: 2010, 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-
fam/cps2010.html (Table AVG1). Taken at face value, 
Comcast‘s assertion that there are millions of geographic 
markets in the Philadelphia DMA (or over one hundred 
million geographic markets nationwide for multichannel 
video programming distributors) renders the phrase 
―geographic market‖ nonsensical. Perhaps for this reason, our 
research revealed no case—nor does Comcast provide one—
in which a geographic market has been set at the individual 
household level. Cf. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 337 (―Thus, 
although the geographic market in some instances may 
encompass the entire Nation, under other circumstances it 
may be as small as a single metropolitan area.‖). 
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Second, we recognize ample evidence in the record 
supporting the District Court‘s factual findings underpinning 
its market determination, which precludes us from reversing 
those findings as clearly erroneous. See, e.g., EBC, Inc. v. 
Clark Bldg. Sys. Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 273 (3d Cir. 2010) (―We 
will not reverse ‗[i]f the district court‘s account of the 
evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its 
entirety‘ even if we would have weighed that evidence 
differently.‖ (quoting Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573-574)). The 
Court cited Dr. Williams‘s seven bases for drawing the 
geographic market as the Philadelphia DMA. Behrend, 264 
F.R.D. at 157-160. Although it rejected three of those bases, 
the remaining four tended to show that Comcast‘s clustering 
had anticompetitive effects in the Philadelphia DMA by 
deterring overbuilders from entering the Designated Market 
Area, and that the industry itself used DMAs to focus its 
competition. Additional evidence in the record, reviewed in 
detail below, demonstrated that clustering results in fewer 
competitors and higher cable prices for the entire market. 
This evidence belies Comcast‘s claim that there is no change 
at the individual level when Comcast aggregates surrounding 
franchises. 
 
Simply put, the District Court determined by a 
preponderance of the evidence that, when addressed on the 
merits, the class may be able to prove through common 
evidence that the relevant geographic market is the 
Philadelphia DMA. This determination did not exceed the 
Court‘s permissible discretion. To the extent Comcast reads 
the Court‘s opinion as actually fixing the relevant geographic 
market, we note that its determination was made solely for the 
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purposes of class certification and will not be binding on the 
merits. See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 318.
8
 
                                              
8
 The Concurring and Dissenting Opinion (―Concurrence-
Dissent‖) faults the parties, the District Court and this 
Opinion for using ―equivocally‖ the phrase ―relevant 
geographic market.‖ Slip Concurring-Dissenting Op. at 8. 
Specifically, it asserts that this Opinion ―assumes . . . that the 
class is properly defined to cover the Philadelphia DMA 
. . . .‖ Id. at 10. The Concurrence-Dissent misunderstands an 
important distinction: as noted supra footnote 4, Plaintiffs 
have alleged a ―class region‖ (to borrow from the 
Concurrence-Dissent‘s terminology) of a ―Philadelphia 
cluster,‖ which is distinct from the contested relevant 
geographic market of the ―Philadelphia DMA.‖ Our 
―assumption‖ concerning the ―class region‖ is an uncontested 
piece of Plaintiffs‘ case: Comcast appeals only the precise 
issue of whether the District Court applied a correct legal 
standard in determining that the substantive antitrust 
geographic market could be established by evidence common 
to the class, not whether the ―Philadelphia cluster‖ is an 
appropriate ―class region.‖ See Appellants‘ Br. at 15 (labeling 
the issue as: ―The District Court Failed To Apply The Correct 
Legal Standard In Its Ruling On Plaintiffs‘ Geographic 
Market Definition‖); id. at 20 (summarizing that ―the alleged 
geographic market accepted by the district court is wholly 
divorced from the legal standard for determining the correct 
geographic market‖). Accordingly, when the Concurrence-
Dissent states, ―A compelling argument could be made . . .,‖ 
Slip Concurring-Dissenting Op. at 11 (emphasis added), it 
goes beyond our role as a reviewing court by raising and 
addressing an argument not before us. See, e.g., AT & T v. 
F.C.C., 582 F.3d 490, 495 (3d Cir. 2009) (―An appellant 
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V. 
 
Comcast hinges its next line of arguments on the 
District Court‘s final certification: ―Proof of antitrust impact 
relative to such claims shall be limited to the theory that 
Comcast engaged in anticompetitive clustering conduct, the 
effect of which was to deter the entry of overbuilders in the 
Philadelphia DMA.‖ App. 00032. According to Comcast, the 
District Court made clearly erroneous findings of fact by 
relying on Plaintiffs‘ expert, Dr. Williams, in support of the 
certified theory of antitrust impact. 
 
The District Court considered in great detail the 
arguments presented by both sides. It rejected three of 
Plaintiffs‘ four theories of class-wide impact. Behrend, 264 
F.R.D. at 166 (rejecting theory of direct broadcast satellite 
(―DBS‖) foreclosure); id. at 177-178 (rejecting benchmark 
theory); id. at 181 (rejecting bargaining power theory). 
Nonetheless, it accepted that Plaintiffs could establish class-
wide antitrust impact on the theory of clustering and its 
impact on overbuilder competition. After detailing the 
evidence put forth by both sides, id. at 166-174, the Court 
concluded that ―the Class has met its burden to demonstrate 
that the anticompetitive effect of clustering on overbuilder 
competition is capable of proof at trial through evidence that 
is common to the class,‖ id. at 174. The Court found that 
through the model of Plaintiffs‘ expert, Dr. Williams, and the 
empirical studies conducted by governmental agencies and 
                                                                                                     
waives an argument in support of reversal if he does not raise 
that argument in his opening brief.‖), rev‘d on other grounds, 
131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011). 
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private researchers, the class had shown that the presence of 
an overbuilder constrains cable prices, and that Comcast 
engaged in conduct designed to deter the entry of 
overbuilders in the Philadelphia DMA. Id. at 174. It found 
unpersuasive the conclusions of Comcast‘s expert, Dr. David 
J. Teece, that overbuilding is not a successful business model. 
Id. at 174-175. 
 
A. 
 
On appeal, Comcast constructs a four-tiered argument 
to support its objections. First, it contends that Plaintiffs 
cannot show class-wide antitrust impact based on potential 
overbuilding by any of the ―Transaction parties.‖9 According 
to Comcast, the evidence demonstrated there was no actual 
competition between the Transaction parties; Plaintiffs 
therefore must show that the challenged conduct eliminated 
potential competition. In Comcast‘s view, the record evidence 
reflects that no Transaction parties had taken any affirmative 
steps to overbuild and, consequently, there was no potential 
competition to eliminate. Second, Comcast contends that 
Plaintiffs identified only RCN Telecom Services, Inc., as 
attempting to overbuild in the Philadelphia DMA. The 
evidence establishes, according to Comcast, that RCN was 
not going to overbuild as a result of its own financial woes, 
not as a result of any alleged activity on the part of Comcast. 
                                              
9
 As detailed supra note 2, the ―Transaction parties‖ are the 
parties that Comcast acquired or with which it swapped cable 
systems, which include: Marcus Cable; Greater Philadelphia 
Cablevision, Inc.; Lenfest Communications, Inc.; AT&T; 
Adelphia Communications Corp.; Time Warner; and Patriot 
Media. 
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Third, as the argument goes, because there was no record 
evidence demonstrating actual or potential competition, the 
theoretical opinions indicating otherwise rendered by 
Plaintiffs‘ expert, Dr. Williams, were clearly erroneous. 
Comcast disputes at many levels Dr. Williams‘s methodology 
and results in his ―market structure‖ and ―market 
performance‖ opinions. Summed up, Comcast contends that 
theoretical expert opinions are no replacement for market 
facts, the record evidence showed no actual or potential 
overbuilding (as addressed in the first two contentions), and 
therefore any reliance on the expert opinions for evidence of 
anticompetitive behavior was clearly erroneous. Fourth, 
Comcast adds that any evidence of anticompetitive conduct 
specific to Delaware County could not serve as evidence of 
class-wide impact for the Philadelphia cluster. 
 
B. 
 
Plaintiffs respond to each level of Comcast‘s position. 
First, citing many portions of the record, they assert that there 
is ―overwhelming‖ record evidence that Comcast‘s clustering 
of the Philadelphia DMA deterred and reduced overbuilding 
competition, resulting in antitrust impact (higher cable prices) 
for all class members. According to the class, the record 
demonstrates: clustering deters overbuilding, the swaps and 
acquisitions eliminated competition, Multi-System Operators 
(―MSOs‖) actually do overbuild one another, Comcast and 
other MSOs look to one another‘s prices to set their own, and 
the MSOs chose affirmatively not to compete. The class adds 
that Comcast is raising a merits argument by asking the Court 
to consider the ―potential competition‖ doctrine. Second, 
Plaintiffs contend that Comcast raises a merits issue by asking 
the Court to examine whether Comcast‘s conduct in fact 
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prevented RCN from overbuilding in more areas than it did. 
In any event, they state that the record evidence demonstrates 
RCN had the intent and capital to overbuild the Philadelphia 
market. Third, Plaintiffs state that Dr. Williams‘s theoretical 
model plainly shows common evidence of class-wide impact; 
Comcast‘s contention that Dr. Williams‘s opinions do not 
prove antitrust impact is one for the jury to decide on the 
merits. Fourth, the evidence related to Delaware County 
―adds to and illustrates‖ the common evidence of Comcast‘s 
anticompetitive clustering conduct. 
 
VI. 
 
We begin the analysis of these contentions by focusing 
on the precise inquiry: 
 
Plaintiffs‘ burden at the class certification stage 
is not to prove the element of antitrust impact, 
although in order to prevail on the merits each 
class member must do so. Instead, the task for 
plaintiffs at class certification is to demonstrate 
that the element of antitrust impact is capable of 
proof at trial through evidence that is common 
to the class rather than individual to its 
members. 
 
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311-312 (emphasis added). 
Many of Comcast‘s contentions ask us to reach into the 
record and determine whether Plaintiffs actually have proven 
antitrust impact. This we will not do. Instead, we inquire 
whether the District Court exceeded its discretion by finding 
that Plaintiffs had demonstrated by a preponderance of the 
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evidence that they could prove antitrust impact through 
common evidence at trial. 
 
This dispute therefore is evidentiary. When facts are at 
issue, the District Court exceeds its discretion in certifying a 
class only if its findings are clearly erroneous. Id. at 312. 
Comcast bears a heavy burden in convincing us that the 
District Court‘s factual findings were clearly erroneous. See 
Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573-574 (―If the district court‘s 
account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record 
viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it . 
. . .‖); Krasnov, 465 F.2d at 1302 (―It is the responsibility of 
an appellate court to accept the ultimate factual determination 
of the fact-finder unless that determination either (1) is 
completely devoid of minimum evidentiary support 
displaying some hue of credibility, or (2) bears no rational 
relationship to the supportive evidentiary data.‖). 
 
 Comcast has not carried its burden. Plaintiffs provided 
evidence at the certification hearing that tended to show that 
Comcast‘s clustering (through swaps and acquisitions) 
reduced competition, deterred the entry of overbuilders, and 
resulted in higher cable prices for the entire class. This 
evidence displays ―some hue of credibility‖ and bears a 
rational relationship to the Court‘s finding. See Krasnov, 465 
F.2d at 1302. 
 
For example, one of Plaintiffs‘ experts, Dr. Williams, 
concluded after a detailed analysis that, inter alia, Comcast‘s 
clustering increased its market share and, consequently, its 
market power, thereby raising barriers to entry for other 
multichannel video programming distributors and resulting in 
higher cable rates for all members of the class. App. 03599-
32 
3600; see also Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 166-171 (providing in 
great detail the analyses, evidentiary support, and conclusions 
of Dr. Williams). Dr. Williams also cited to Federal 
Communications Commission reports, Government 
Accountability Office reports, and academic research, all of 
which indicated that reducing competition by clustering leads 
to higher cable rates. App. 03663-3668. Another expert, Dr. 
Hal Singer, used extensive record evidence to analyze how 
Comcast‘s clustering denied overbuilders access to the 
Philadelphia DMA. App. 03501-3529. Dr. Singer concluded 
that Comcast‘s actions allowed it to foreclose competitors and 
elevate prices. App. 03450. He also referenced multiple 
studies—both governmental and private, some of which 
overlapped with those referenced by Dr. Williams—that 
concluded that cable prices are lower when overbuilder 
competition is present. App. 03537-3548. Also in the record 
are specific instances of Multi-System Operators attempting 
to overbuild one another around the country. See Appellees‘ 
Br. 27 n.17 (citing 13 distinct examples in the record of 
MSOs overbuilding one another).  
 
All of this evidence demonstrates that Comcast‘s 
alleged clustering conduct indeed could have reduced 
competition, raised barriers to market entry by an overbuilder, 
and resulted in higher cable prices to all of its subscribers in 
the Philadelphia Designated Market Area. Based on this 
evidence, we determine that the antitrust impact Plaintiffs 
allege is ―plausible in theory‖ and ―susceptible to proof at 
trial through available evidence common to the class.‖ 
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 325; see also In re 
Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 305 F.3d 145, 158 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(holding that common issues predominated sufficient for class 
certification when plaintiffs allegedly ―were all affected by 
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the increased price‖ they paid for linerboard). We are 
satisfied that the District Court‘s findings were supported by 
the evidence and were not clearly erroneous. 
 
Comcast protests that the record demonstrates that 
there was no actual or potential competition among the 
Transaction parties. In light of the above record evidence, 
however, Comcast‘s interpretation of the evidence does not 
render the District Court‘s findings clearly erroneous. 
Comcast remains free to make these arguments to the jury. 
 
VII. 
 
Comcast‘s other contentions are equally unpersuasive. 
There is conflicting evidence as to the role Comcast played in 
RCN Telecom Services, Inc.‘s decision to not overbuild 
further in the Philadelphia DMA. Plaintiffs highlight record 
evidence that RCN had the intent and capital necessary to 
overbuild the Philadelphia market. Appellees‘ Br. 34-35. 
Comcast contends instead that RCN faced financial woes, as 
a result of which it abandoned its plans to overbuild. 
Appellants‘ Br. 24-28. The District Court credited Plaintiffs‘ 
explanation: ―What Dr. Teece considers ‗unlikely,‘ Dr. Singer 
considers to be the common evidence of antitrust impact, 
namely that RCN was stymied in its efforts by Comcast‘s 
predatory behavior.‖ Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 175. Again, we 
are satisfied that the District Court‘s finding was not clearly 
erroneous. ―Where there are two permissible views of the 
evidence, the factfinder‘s choice between them cannot be 
clearly erroneous.‖ Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574. Here there are 
two permissible views of the evidence and we will not disturb 
the District Court‘s finding. 
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Similarly, Comcast contends that Dr. Williams‘s 
analysis and methodology was flawed for various reasons, 
including the allegation that it was unsupported by any actual 
evidence. We disagree. As detailed above, there was ample 
evidence that clustering conduct can deter entry of 
overbuilders and result in higher cable prices. Dr. Williams 
and Dr. Singer examined evidence specific to Comcast‘s 
activities in the Philadelphia market, as well as numerous 
independent studies on the effects of cable clustering, to reach 
their conclusions. Comcast cites various cases for the 
proposition that ―expert theory is not a substitute for market 
facts.‖ See, e.g., Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 242 (1993) (expert opinion 
rendered unreasonable by indisputable record facts); In re 
New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig., 522 
F.3d 6, 27 (1st Cir. 2008) (expert analysis unfinished and 
―purely conclusory‖); In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 
F.3d 112, 135 (3d Cir. 1999) (―An expert opinion based on . . 
. meager superficial information . . . is highly speculative, 
unreliable, and of dubious admissibility.‖). Although 
expressing a correct legal precept, those cases addressed 
situations in which the experts largely failed to tie their 
theories to any evidence; the precept therefore does not apply 
to this case in which the experts‘ theories were based on and 
correlated to other record evidence. 
 
Comcast also asserts that every individual had one or 
two options from which to choose cable and that 
consequently only the name of the provider changed, not the 
number of options. This assertion completely overlooks the 
nature of the claims of the class: by clustering, Comcast was 
able to deter the entry of overbuilders, which resulted in 
higher prices for all non-basic Comcast subscribers. And 
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Plaintiffs provided evidence that clustering can have this 
effect. In short, the District Court‘s task was to weigh expert 
testimony and make a determination, Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 
F.3d at 323, and we discern no error in the Court‘s 
determination that Dr. Williams‘s analysis demonstrated that 
class-wide antitrust impact was susceptible to common proof. 
 
As to Comcast‘s remaining contention that the District 
Court erred by crediting as evidence of class-wide impact the 
alleged conduct targeted at RCN Telecom Services, Inc., in 
Delaware County, we agree with the class that the alleged 
conduct is relevant to establishing class-wide impact. We 
have explained that ―courts must look to the monopolist‘s 
conduct taken as a whole rather than considering each aspect 
in isolation.‖ LePage‘s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 162 (3d Cir. 
2003) (en banc) (citing Cont‘l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & 
Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699 (1962)). Alleged specific 
conduct aimed at preventing the entry of an overbuilder 
anywhere in the Philadelphia DMA supports Plaintiffs‘ 
allegations of Comcast‘s ability to maintain supra-
competitive prices for the entire market. 
 
VIII. 
 
At bottom, Comcast misconstrues our role at this stage 
of the litigation. Comcast would have us decide on the merits 
whether there was actual or potential competition among the 
Transaction parties, the reason RCN Telecom Services, Inc., 
abandoned the Philadelphia market, and whether Plaintiffs‘ 
experts proved antitrust impact. We are not the jury. Although 
in Hydrogen Peroxide we heightened the inquiry a district 
court must perform on the issue of class certification, nothing 
in that opinion indicated that class certification hearings were 
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to become actual trials in which factual disputes are to be 
resolved. Indeed, as we explained in Hydrogen Peroxide, a 
district court may inquire into the merits only insofar as it is 
―necessary‖ to determine whether a class certification 
requirement is met. 552 F.3d at 316. Eisen still precludes any 
further inquiry. See Eisen, 417 U.S. at 178 (―[T]he question is 
not whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs . . . will prevail on the 
merits, but rather whether the requirements of Rule 23 are 
met.‖ (quoting Judge Wisdom‘s holding in Miller v. Mackey 
Int‘l, Inc., 452 F.2d 424, 427 (5th Cir. 1971))); Hydrogen 
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 317 (―Eisen is best understood to 
preclude only a merits inquiry that is not necessary to 
determine a Rule 23 requirement.‖). We allow preliminary 
merits inquiries when necessary for Rule 23 because of the 
potentially ―decisive effect on litigation‖ of a certification 
decision, Newton, 259 F.3d at 167, but those inquiries remain 
limited and non-binding on the merits at trial, Hydrogen 
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 318. Nothing in Hydrogen Peroxide 
requires plaintiffs to prove their case at the class certification 
stage; to the contrary, they must establish by a preponderance 
that their case is one that meets each requirement of Rule 23. 
To require more contravenes Eisen and runs dangerously 
close to stepping on the toes of the Seventh Amendment by 
preempting the jury‘s factual findings with our own.10 
                                              
10
 Indeed, recent scholarship uniformly has expressed concern 
over the trend towards converting certification decisions into 
mini trials. See Joshua P. Davis & Eric L. Cramer, Antitrust, 
Class Certification, and the Politics of Procedure, 17 Geo. 
Mason L. Rev. 969, 970 (2010) (contending that the ―judicial 
tendency to impose requirements at class certification‖ serves 
no legitimate purpose and risks violating the Seventh 
Amendment); Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, 
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 In sum, we hold that the District Court‘s 
determination—that Plaintiffs have demonstrated by a 
preponderance of the evidence that they can establish class-
wide antitrust impact through common evidence—did not 
exceed its discretion. 
 
IX. 
 
To satisfy another portion of the predominance 
requirement, Plaintiffs must establish that the alleged 
damages are capable of measurement on a class-wide basis 
using common proof. See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 
311, 325-326; cf. Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
                                                                                                     
The Unjustified Judicial Creation of Class Certification 
Merits Trials in Securities Fraud Actions, 43 U. Mich. J.L. 
Reform 323, 323 (2010) (stating that judicial resolution of 
merits at the certification stage precludes victims from 
obtaining redress, infringes on the Seventh Amendment, and 
serves no legitimate policy concerns); Steig D. Olson, 
―Chipping Away‖: The Misguided Trend Toward Resolving 
Merits Disputes as Part of the Class Certification Calculus, 43 
U.S.F. L. Rev. 935, 940 (2009) (intensifying the Rule 23 
analysis is inconsistent with the Rule itself and highly 
inefficient); J. Douglas Richards & Benjamin D. Brown, 
Predominance of Common Questions – Common Mistakes in 
Applying the Class Action Standard, 41 Rutgers L.J. 163, 169 
(2009) (contending, inter alia, that requiring the district court 
to determine by a preponderance whether plaintiffs‘ proposed 
proof is actually correct or incorrect would ―substitute a 
court‘s own evaluation of key merits questions for that of the 
jury‖). 
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Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 187 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that the 
―Herculean task‖ of calculating individual damages from 
hundreds of millions of different transactions ―counsels 
against finding predominance‖). The District Court concluded 
that Plaintiffs, through their expert Dr. McClave, provided a 
damages model based on a common methodology available to 
measure and quantify damages on a class-wide basis. 264 
F.R.D. at 191. Comcast assails that determination as an abuse 
of discretion. 
 
A. 
 
The District Court examined the methodology, 
conclusions, and criticisms of the experts on both sides, 
before providing its conclusions. 264 F.R.D. at 181-191. 
(Comcast does not contest that the Court performed the 
―rigorous analysis‖ required by Hydrogen Peroxide.) Because 
on appeal Comcast renews the arguments it made to the 
District Court, we set forth each side‘s position in the District 
Court and the Court‘s response. 
 
Plaintiffs‘ damages expert, Dr. McClave, concluded 
that the prices in the Philadelphia market were consistently 
and substantially higher than the prices in areas of effective 
competition. 264 F.R.D. at 181. His econometric analysis 
demonstrated that the alleged antitrust impact was class-wide, 
because the prices were elevated above competitive levels 
across all class members and for the entire time period. Id. 
For his methods, Dr. McClave constructed ―but-for‖ prices 
against which to compare the prices Comcast charged in the 
Philadelphia DMA. ―But-for‖ prices are those that would 
have existed absent the alleged anticompetitive conduct. To 
construct the ―but-for‖ prices, he first selected comparable 
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―benchmark‖ counties around the country by applying two 
―screens‖ to determine whether the counties represented a 
level of competition similar to what Comcast would have 
faced in the Philadelphia market absent its alleged 
anticompetitive conduct. It is important to understand these 
two screens. The first screen—the ―market share screen‖ or 
―40% screen‖—required that the county have a Comcast 
subscriber penetration rate of less than 40%. App. 03410. Dr. 
McClave chose 40% because it represented the approximate 
midpoint of Comcast‘s penetration rate in the Philadelphia 
DMA (between approximately 20% in 1998 and 60% from 
2003 through 2008). He chose this number also because it 
allowed for growth during the class period but focused on 
markets where Comcast was likely to have less market power 
than it does in the Philadelphia market. Id. The second 
screen—the ―Direct Broadcast Satellite screen‖, or ―DBS 
screen‖—required that the county be in a Designated Market 
Area where the penetration level for Alternative Delivery 
Systems (which essentially includes DBS, but also master 
antenna systems and multipoint distribution systems) was at 
or higher than the national average of Alternative Delivery 
Systems penetration rates in Comcast markets.
11
 Using data 
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 Dr. McClave used Alternative Delivery Systems 
penetration rates as a proxy to measure Direct Broadcast 
Satellite penetration rates. App. 03410 n.11. Comcast‘s 
expert, Dr. Chipty, referred to the screen as the ―DBS 
screen,‖ and as measuring DBS penetration rates. App. 
03834. The parties and District Court have continued using 
the DBS terminology. Although the screen technically 
measured Alternative Delivery Systems penetration rates, we 
will use the parties‘ terminology and refer to it as the ―DBS 
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from the counties that fit the two screens, Dr. McClave 
performed a multiple regression analysis to compare actual 
prices in the Philadelphia DMA to the estimated ―but-for‖ 
prices. He then applied the overcharge percentage to the 
relevant revenue obtained by Comcast for expanded basic 
service in the Philadelphia market during the class period to 
reach a final conservative estimated overcharge value: 
$875,576,662. 
 
Comcast‘s experts, Dr. Teece and Dr. Tasneem Chipty, 
contested several parts of Dr. McClave‘s methodology, and 
questioned his results. 264 F.R.D. at 183. First, they 
challenged both benchmark screens used by Dr. McClave. 
Regarding the ―DBS screen,‖ Dr. Teece asserted that Dr. 
McClave erroneously chose the higher national Direct 
Broadcast Satellite penetration rate, instead of the lower 
regional rate predicted by Plaintiffs‘ experts Dr. Singer and 
Dr. Williams. The District Court rejected the critique, stating 
that Dr. McClave ―used his national average DBS penetration 
screen as a descriptor of typical competitive market 
conditions,‖ and was not attempting to predict the Direct 
Broadcast Satellite penetration rate of the Philadelphia DMA. 
Id. at 184. Regarding the ―market share screen,‖ Dr. Chipty 
contended that because Comcast was present in only a few 
counties in 1999, its actual market share was much higher in 
the counties where it was and 0% where it was not; as a 
result, the less-than-40% penetration rate provided an 
inappropriate screen. App. 03833. The District Court rejected 
the criticism as unsupported by the record, stating that Dr. 
Chipty should have presented evidentiary data to show that 
                                                                                                     
screen‖ and as measuring Direct Broadcast Satellite 
penetration rates. 
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40% was an incorrect midpoint estimate or average rate. 264 
F.R.D. at 184. The Court also noted that the 40% screen was 
supported by the evidence as Comcast‘s approximate share of 
the Philadelphia DMA at the midpoint of the class period. Id. 
at 184 n.43. 
 
Second, Dr. Chipty faulted Dr. McClave‘s model for 
failing to consider properly demographic variables among the 
counties: specifically, for omitting the variables of population 
density and the number and type of households. The District 
Court credited as well-supported Dr. McClave‘s response as 
to why he omitted population density: it is correlated with 
medium household income (which he included) and using it 
as well as household income would create confounding and 
unreliable results. 264 F.R.D. at 185-186. Additionally, 
according to Dr. McClave, adding it would mask the effects 
of anticompetitive influences because higher population 
density results in lower costs per subscriber. Id. at 185. The 
Court noted that Dr. Chipty‘s use of population density as a 
variable resulted in it being positive and statistically 
significant in one model but negative and statistically 
significant in another. Id. at 186. Moreover, the Court added 
that Federal Communications Commission and Government 
Accountability Office studies included population density but 
found it was not a statistically significant variable. Id. 
 
Third, Dr. Chipty criticized Dr. McClave‘s model for 
comparing list prices for expanded basic cable in the 
Philadelphia DMA against the benchmark counties. She 
opined that Dr. McClave‘s model did not take into account 
the significant number of promotions and discounts offered to 
Comcast customers. Id. at 187. Dr. Chipty offered several 
rebuttal models that included population density and 
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discounted prices, which resulted in significantly lower or 
even negative damages. The Court rejected Dr. Chipty‘s 
models as ―suffer[ing] significant flaws.‖ Id. at 188, 189. It 
stated that Dr. McClave‘s model accounted for discount 
prices in the formula (not model) when he multiplied 
anticompetitive overcharge by Comcast‘s relevant revenues 
(because Comcast receives revenue only for prices charged, 
the revenue side of the formula by definition includes 
discount prices). Accordingly, by adding discount prices to 
the model as well, Dr. Chipty‘s model doubly counted the 
discount. The Court also noted that, as Dr. McClave 
explained, more than 80% of Comcast‘s customers pay list 
price for expanded basic cable, and discounts from list prices 
are temporary (after which they return to list price). As to 
another of Dr. Chipty‘s models, which calculated damages 
through direct calculations instead of multiple regression, the 
Court rejected it in the words of Dr. McClave as a ―novel and 
non-standard formula for calculating damages.‖ Id. at 189. 
 
Fourth, the District Court rejected Dr. Chipty‘s attempt 
to impeach Dr. McClave‘s model by using it to calculate 
damages for basic cable prices, instead of expanded basic 
cable. Id. at 190. The Court explained that Dr. McClave‘s 
model aimed to analyze only expanded basic cable, because 
Comcast alters its prices at the expanded level, so ―any 
application of the McClave model to [basic cable prices] 
explains nothing.‖ Id. Comcast does not contest that ruling. 
 
Fifth and finally, the Court asked the parties after the 
hearing how to interpret Dr. McClave‘s damages model if it 
credited at least one, but not all, of Dr. Williams‘s four 
theories of antitrust impact. Id. It determined that Dr. 
McClave‘s damages model was still viable, even if it rejected 
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some theories of antitrust impact, explaining that Dr. 
McClave selected benchmarks to isolate the effect of 
anticompetitive conduct, and that his use of the DBS screen 
was ―entirely unrelated‖ to Dr. Williams‘s DBS foreclosure 
theory. Id. The Court concluded that Dr. Williams‘s theories 
of antitrust impact were not relevant to Dr. McClave‘s 
methods of choosing benchmarks because ―[a]ny 
anticompetitive conduct is reflected in the Philadelphia DMA 
price, not in the selection of the comparison counties.‖ Id. at 
191. 
 
B. 
 
Comcast contends that the District Court exceeded its 
discretion in accepting Plaintiffs‘ proposed damages 
calculation methodology. Its arguments are recast versions of 
those rejected by the District Court. First, Comcast contends 
that Dr. McClave‘s damages theory was based on all of 
Plaintiffs‘ alleged anticompetitive effects, but the District 
Court rejected three of Plaintiffs‘ four theories. Because Dr. 
McClave stated that his model was based on the cumulative 
effect and could not isolate damages for individual theories of 
harm, according to Comcast the District Court erred in 
accepting the damages model. Second, Comcast asserts that 
the economic assumptions underlying the damages model 
lack foundation in the record evidence. According to 
Comcast, both screens employed by Dr. McClave are 
factually unsupported and economically unsound: the ―DBS 
penetration screen‖ because the Court rejected Dr. Williams‘s 
Direct Broadcast Satellite foreclosure theory, and the ―market 
share screen‖ because it bears no relation to the conditions 
that would have existed in the Philadelphia region but for the 
complained-of conduct. Third, Comcast contends that the 
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damages model is flawed because it fails to include 
population density as a variable, and because it calculates 
damages based on list prices, which fails to consider the 
discounted prices that some subscribers actually pay.
12
 
 
Plaintiffs remind us that the District Court already 
thoroughly considered and rebutted each of the points that 
Comcast now raises. As to the specific contentions, first, the 
class asserts that the District Court explicitly held that Dr. 
McClave‘s model was suitable for calculation of damages on 
all or individual theories of liability. Second, the class 
emphasizes that the damages model provides a methodology 
that can establish damages on a class-wide basis using 
common proof, and that Comcast ignores the proper inquiry 
at class certification and instead prematurely attacks the 
merits of the model. As a result, Comcast‘s arguments 
concerning the benchmarks miss the point. Third, the class 
asserts that Dr. McClave had ample justification to omit 
population density as a variable, and that the damages model 
incorporates discount prices. 
 
X. 
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 Following the Supreme Court‘s decision in Wal-Mart, 
Comcast added that Dr. McClave‘s damages model, like the 
expert model in Wal-Mart, could be ―safely disregard[ed].‖ 
See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554. We disagree. The factual 
and legal underpinnings of Wal-Mart—which involved a 
massive discrimination class action and different sections of 
Rule 23—are clearly distinct from those of this case. Wal-
Mart therefore neither guides nor governs the dispute before 
us. 
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We pause to identify the forest for the trees. If allowed 
to proceed to trial, the class must establish that the injury it 
suffered from the violation of the antitrust laws is measurable. 
See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311; see also Newton, 
259 F.3d at 188 (―Proof of injury (whether or not an injury 
occurred at all) must be distinguished from calculation of 
damages (which determines the actual value of the injury).‖). 
The usual measure in an overcharge case ―is the difference 
between the illegal price that was actually charged and the 
price that would have been charged ‗but for‘ the violation 
multiplied by the number of units purchased.‖ Areeda et al., 
supra, ¶ 392a. Given the inherent difficulty of identifying a 
―but-for world,‖ we do not require that damages be measured 
with certainty, but rather that they be demonstrated as ―a 
matter of just and reasonable inference.‖ Story Parchment Co. 
v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931) 
(―[W]hile the damages may not be determined by mere 
speculation or guess, it will be enough if the evidence show 
the extent of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable 
inference . . . .‖); see also Stelwagon Mfg. Co. v. Tarmac 
Roofing Sys., Inc., 63 F.3d 1267, 1273 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing 
Story Parchment and explaining that ―damage issues in these 
cases are rarely susceptible to the kind of concrete, detailed 
proof of injury which is available in other contexts‖). 
 
The inquiry for a district court at the class certification 
stage is whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated by a 
preponderance of the evidence that they will be able to 
measure damages on a class-wide basis using common proof. 
See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 325. Some variation of 
damages among class members does not defeat certification. 
See 7AA Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 1781 (3d ed. 2005) (stating for antitrust class 
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certification that ―it uniformly has been held that differences 
among the members as to the amount of damages incurred 
does not mean that a class action would be inappropriate.‖). 
Complex and individual questions of damages, however, 
weigh against finding predominance. Compare Newton, 259 
F.3d at 187 (reasoning that having to examine proof of the 
circumstances of hundreds of millions of individual 
transactions counseled against finding predominance), with 
Linerboard, 305 F.3d at 157-158 (determining that, in contrast 
to Newton, all purchasers were affected by the increased 
price). As the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
explained: 
 
It is true that the validity of plaintiffs‘ theory is 
a common disputed issue. It will be for the fact 
finder to decide whether this theory is 
persuasive. At the class certification stage, 
however, the district court must still ensure that 
the plaintiffs‘ presentation of their case will be 
through means amenable to the class action 
mechanism. We are looking here not for hard 
factual proof, but for a more thorough 
explanation of how the pivotal evidence behind 
plaintiff‘s theory can be established. If there is 
no realistic means of proof, many resources will 
be wasted setting up a trial that plaintiffs cannot 
win. 
 
In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig., 
522 F.3d 6, 29 (1st Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); see also 
Areeda et al., supra, ¶ 331 (explaining for the issue of 
47 
damages that ―courts will not permit class actions unless they 
can devise a practical means for their litigation‖).13 
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 In response to the Concurrence-Dissent‘s position that 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 
(1993), applies at the stage of class certification, see Slip 
Concurrence-Dissent Op. at 16, we make two observations. 
First, as the Opinion acknowledges, ―in neither the District 
Court nor before us‖ did Comcast raise this issue, id. at 17 
n.18, and it is therefore not properly before us. Second, 
although the Supreme Court recently hinted that Daubert may 
apply for evaluating expert testimony at the class certification 
stage, it need not turn class certification into a mini-trial. 
Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553-54. We understand the Court‘s 
observation to require a district court to evaluate whether an 
expert is presenting a model which could evolve to become 
admissible evidence, and not requiring a district court to 
determine if a model is perfect at the certification stage. This 
is consistent with our jurisprudence which requires that at 
class certification stage, we evaluate expert models to 
determine whether the theory of proof is plausible. Hydrogen 
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 324. ―[I]f such impact is plausible in 
theory, it is also susceptible to proof at trial through available 
evidence common to the class. When the latter issue is 
genuinely disputed, the district court must resolve it after 
considering all relevant evidence.‖ Id. at 325. When plaintiffs 
present multiple models created by expert witnesses that can 
show common evidence and those models are based on data, 
a district court does not have to determine which model 
should be used at the time of class certification. Linerboard, 
305 F.3d at 155. Here, the District Court likely determined 
that Dr. McClave‘s model could be refined between the time 
48 
 
On appeal, the inquiry narrows. Because the District 
Court held that Plaintiffs had established they could measure 
damages through common proof, we examine whether that 
determination was beyond the Court‘s discretion. Having 
identified the forest of law, we proceed to scrutinize the 
timber that Comcast faults as rotted. 
 
A. 
 
Comcast contends that Dr. McClave‘s model cannot 
isolate damages for individual theories of harm, and that it 
therefore cannot distinguish between lawful and unlawful 
competition. Comcast cites Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler 
Corp., 525 F.2d 1338, 1353 (3d Cir. 1975), and Concord Boat 
Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1057 (8th Cir. 
2000). In both cases, following adverse jury verdicts, the 
courts held that the experts‘ theories of damages were 
―speculation‖—not ―just and reasonable inferences‖—
because the models did not distinguish between the effects of 
lawful and unlawful competition. In Coleman, we quoted the 
guidepost of Story Parchment: ―The rule which precludes the 
recovery of uncertain damages applies to such as are not the 
certain result of the wrong, not to those damages which are 
definitely attributable to the wrong and only uncertain in 
respect of their amount.‖ Coleman, 525 F.2d at 1353 (quoting 
Story Parchment, 282 U.S. at 562). 
 
 We are not persuaded by Comcast‘s argument. To 
measure damages, Dr. McClave used screens to select and 
                                                                                                     
when class certification was granted and trial so as to comply 
with Daubert. 
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average benchmark counties against which to compare the 
actual Philadelphia market. The screens themselves were not 
intended to calculate damages, but instead to construct an 
estimated competitive ―but-for‖ Philadelphia market (a 
market absent the alleged anticompetitive conduct). For 
example, although the screens incorporated Direct Broadcast 
Satellite penetration rates, those rates were included to 
estimate typical competitive market conditions, not to 
calculate liability for the foreclosure of DBS competitors.
14
 
The model then calculates damages by comparing actual 
prices to the constructed ―but-for‖ market. Differences 
between actual prices and ―but-for‖ prices reflect 
anticompetitive impact. In other words, the model calculates 
supra-competitive prices regardless of the type of 
anticompetitive conduct. Further, the model uses standard 
econometric methodology to calculate damages. See 
generally Areeda et al., supra, ¶ 394 (detailing the basic steps 
in calculating antitrust damages). Indeed, as Dr. McClave 
highlighted, Comcast‘s expert Dr. Chipty employed the same 
methodological approach—identify a suitable benchmark and 
employ multiple regression analysis to control for 
differences—to estimate damages on a class-wide basis. App. 
04041 (―Dr. Chipty and I agree that the application of 
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 The Concurrence-Dissent misreads this observation as 
addressing the on-the-merits validity of the DBS screen. Slip 
Concurring-Dissenting Op. at 25-27. We address Comcast‘s 
contention regarding the merits of the DBS screen, however, 
infra Part X. This observation indicates simply that the 
exclusion of the DBS foreclosure theory of liability does not 
render Dr. McClave‘s damages methodology incapable of 
calculating damages on a class-wide basis if the class can 
prove that Comcast engaged in anticompetitive behavior. 
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multiple regression analysis to compare Philadelphia to a 
suitable benchmark is an appropriate methodology that can be 
applied on a classwide basis to quantify the amount of 
economic damages in this case.‖). 
 
As a result, if the class proves at trial that Comcast 
engaged in anticompetitive behavior, it can use the 
constructed ―but-for‖ market to measure the anticompetitive 
impact on the class members. At the class certification stage 
we do not require that Plaintiffs tie each theory of antitrust 
impact to an exact calculation of damages, but instead that 
they assure us that if they can prove antitrust impact, the 
resulting damages are capable of measurement and will not 
require labyrinthine individual calculations. Cf. Newton, 259 
F.3d at 187. We are satisfied that Plaintiffs‘ damages model 
meets this burden.
15
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 The Concurrence-Dissent states that Dr. McClave‘s 
damages theory can establish damages only in the five 
counties where RCN attempted to overbuild. This concern 
misses the central theory of Plaintiffs‘ case: by deterring the 
entry of overbuilders through clustering, Comcast allegedly 
maintained higher prices across the entire market area. Dr. 
McClave‘s damages model appropriately reflected a ―but-for‖ 
world by accounting for overbuilding only in the five counties 
where RCN attempted to overbuild, and his resulting 
calculations showed that—taking the limited actual 
overbuilding into account—―the Philadelphia DMA market 
prices were elevated above the but-for prices in every county-
year combination.‖ App. 03412. Additionally, the 
Concurrence-Dissent apparently takes up the mantle of an 
additional Comcast expert and raises multiple arguments 
against Dr. McClave‘s damages model not addressed by 
51 
 
Additionally, the cases that Comcast offers are 
distinguishable on multiple grounds. Most to the point, those 
cases considered the merits of experts‘ theories following 
adverse jury verdicts; here, we address only whether Plaintiffs 
have provided a method to measure and quantify damages on 
a class-wide basis. We have not reached the stage of 
determining on the merits whether the methodology is a just 
and reasonable inference or speculative. And, to the extent 
Comcast worries about distinguishing between lawful and 
unlawful conduct, Dr. McClave‘s damages methodology does 
not suffer from the defects present in those cases because it 
constructs a competitive ―but-for‖ world that includes lawful 
competition, not a hypothetical one bereft of both lawful and 
unlawful competition. See Concord, 207 F.3d at 1056-1057 
(model was ―mere speculation‖ because it ignored 
inconvenient evidence, failed to account for external market 
events, and did not incorporate economic reality of market); 
Coleman, 525 F.2d at 1352-1353 (model premised on 
hypothetical world without even lawful competition).
16
 
                                                                                                     
Comcast‘s experts at the District Court level nor advanced by 
Comcast on appeal. We must limit our review to the issues 
presented by Appellants and Appellees. We are not permitted 
to embark on an intellectual adventure of our own. 
16
 Comcast adds that because overbuilding occurs at the 
franchise level, Dr. McClave‘s county-to-county metric 
cannot calculate damages if the jury finds that only some (if 
any) franchises were impacted. First, Dr. McClave indicated 
that franchises within counties often have identical or nearly 
identical pricing, which assuages Comcast‘s concern. See 
App. 03409. Second, Comcast is attempting again to redefine 
the relevant market: inasmuch as Plaintiffs have established 
52 
 
B. 
 
Comcast‘s remaining arguments contest specific parts 
of Dr. McClave‘s damages methodology. These contentions 
are a renewal of those it made to the District Court, each of 
which the Court rejected. For those determinations to be 
beyond the Court‘s discretion, Comcast must convince us that 
the Court‘s acceptance of the pieces of Dr. McClave‘s 
methodology was clearly erroneous. 
 
At the outset, we agree with the class that the heart of 
Comcast‘s arguments are attacks on the merits of the 
methodology that have no place in the class certification 
inquiry. Even if we were to overrule as clearly erroneous the 
District Court‘s findings on all four contested pieces of Dr. 
McClave‘s methodology—i.e., modify both of Dr. McClave‘s 
screens,
17
 add population density as a variable, and 
incorporate Dr. Chipty‘s proposed method for calculating 
                                                                                                     
that the relevant geographic market can be the Philadelphia 
DMA, see supra Part IV.A, their damages model passes 
muster at this stage of the proceedings. 
17
 The Concurrence-Dissent—unlike Comcast‘s experts, 
Comcast‘s lawyers and the District Court—identifies a ―third 
screen.‖ Slip Concurring-Dissenting Op. at 22. Again, this 
―screen‖ was not raised by the parties before us and we do not 
address it (we doubt additionally that it is a screen: the two 
screens were used to select benchmark counties, whereas the 
presence of overbuilders was an identification attached to the 
already-selected benchmark counties for purposes of 
performing a multiple regression analysis, see App. 03412, 
03421 (Corrected McClave Decl.)). 
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discounts—only the final amount of estimated damages 
would change. See App. 03082 (Hr‘g Ex.) (chart 
demonstrating differing damages amounts based on different 
model specifications, including Dr. Chipty‘s suggested 
specifications); App. 04557 (Dr. McClave Supplemental 
Decl.) (damages remain class-wide and substantial even using 
Dr. Chipty‘s proposed methodology, after correcting for two 
obvious errors). Comcast‘s assertions do not impeach the 
District Court‘s ultimate holding that damages are capable of 
common proof on a class-wide basis. See Behrend, 264 
F.R.D. at 191; see also In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., 527 
F.3d 517, 535 (6th Cir. 2008) (―Indeed, we have never 
required a precise mathematical calculation of damages 
before deeming a class worthy of certification.‖). All of the 
cases Comcast proffers examine damages models on their 
merits following adverse jury verdicts. For reasons explained 
above, these cases do not address the question at the class 
certification stage. Because Comcast‘s contentions do not cast 
doubt on the District Court‘s holding that Plaintiffs will be 
able to measure class-wide damages through a common 
methodology, we decline to consider them further. See 
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 317 (describing the Supreme 
Court‘s rule prohibiting consideration of the merits if not 
―necessary‖ for purposes of Rule 23) (citing Eisen, 417 U.S. 
at 177). 
 
Plaintiffs have provided a common methodology to 
measure and quantify damages on a class-wide basis. The 
District Court acted within its discretion in so finding.
18
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 The Concurrence-Dissent expresses its additional concern 
over using mathematical averages across the Philadelphia 
DMA, given the potential variation among the franchise 
54 
                                                                                                     
areas. Once again, this concern is notably absent from 
Comcast‘s briefing (except as already addressed above 
regarding the screens and demographic variables). Nor does 
the Concurrence-Dissent grapple with the abuse-of-discretion 
standard of review we must apply to the District Court‘s 
acceptance of Dr. McClave‘s damages model. We also note in 
passing that the Concurrence-Dissent overstates the degree of 
dissimilarity among the franchise areas. It recognizes that Dr. 
McClave‘s model examines actual prices on a county-by-
county level, see Slip Concurring-Dissenting Op. at 39-40 
n.36, but fails to note, as Dr. McClave explained: ―Many 
franchises within counties often have identical or nearly 
identical pricing. More price variability, and thus from an 
econometric perspective more information about prices and 
their determinants, is obtained by aggregating prices at the 
county level.‖ App. 03409 (Corrected McClave Decl.). Not 
even Comcast‘s expert contested this reasoning. See App. 
03831 (Chipty Decl.); App. 03954 (Chipty Rebuttal Report). 
Finally, to the extent the Concurrence-Dissent questions the 
appropriateness of using county-level statistics to measure 
damages across the entire Philadelphia DMA, we observe that 
this question was contested strenuously and repeatedly by the 
experts on both sides at the District Court level. See App. 
03410 (Corrected McClave Decl.) (explaining choice of 
market share screen); App. 03833 (Chipty Decl.) (contesting 
market share screen); App. 04066 (McClave Rebuttal Decl.) 
(defending market share screen); App. 03961 (Chipty 
Rebuttal Report) (disputing screen again); App. 04262 
(McClave Reply Decl.) (responding to Dr. Chipty‘s criticisms 
of screen). After reviewing the reports and hearing careful 
examination of the experts on this point, the District Court 
found that Dr. McClave‘s 40% county-level market-share 
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XI. 
 
The District Court certified the class for resolution of 
four claims. Comcast contends that the District Court erred by 
certifying the following claim: 
 
Whether Defendants conspired with 
competitors, and whether Defendants entered 
into and implemented agreements with 
competitors, to allocate markets, territories, and 
customers for cable television services; and 
whether such conduct is a per se violation, or 
whether it constitutes a restraint of trade in 
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1. 
 
App. 00031 (emphasis added). According to Comcast, the 
District Court lacked any legal authority to certify a per se 
claim based on the class‘s allegations. 
 
                                                                                                     
screen was ―supported by the evidence‖ and that Dr. Chipty‘s 
rebuttal was not supported by appropriate data. 264 F.R.D. at 
184. Through a clearly erroneous lens, we may not reverse a 
District Court‘s factual finding if we would weigh the 
evidence differently; instead, the Court‘s finding must be 
implausible in light of the record, Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573-
574, or completely devoid of minimum evidentiary support 
displaying some hue of credibility, Krasnov, 465 F.2d at 
1302. The Concurrence-Dissent breezes past this formidable 
standard of review to reach its own factual finding. 
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 This is a merits issue beyond the scope of our Rule 
23(f) jurisdiction. Comcast misconstrues the District Court‘s 
certification order. The Court certified the class and stated 
that one of the questions to be litigated is whether there has 
been a per se violation. It did not declare that a per se 
violation had occurred. Appeals taken pursuant to Rule 23(f) 
do not furnish the proper vehicle to address the merits of 
Plaintiffs‘ antitrust claims. See McKowan Lowe & Co. v. 
Jasmine, Ltd., 295 F.3d 380, 390 (3d Cir. 2002) (describing 
the ―scrupulous‖ limits of Rule 23(f) jurisdiction). Comcast 
appeals from the District Court‘s determination that questions 
of law or fact common to class members predominate, which 
was the only issue before the District Court. See App. 00029 
(District Ct. Certification Order) (―The only class certification 
element that remained in dispute was the requirement of Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) that common issues of law and fact 
predominate.‖). Comcast itself stipulated as much. See App. 
00436 (Comcast Letter to the District Ct., Mar. 25, 2009) 
(―With respect to the issues to be addressed in a new class 
certification motion, Comcast is prepared to stipulate that the 
only issues to be resolved are those of antitrust impact and 
methodology of damages . . . .‖). Comcast‘s request to have 
us declare on the merits that Plaintiffs cannot establish a per 
se antitrust violation is beyond the scope of the certification 
decision from which Comcast appeals pursuant to Rule 23(f). 
Accordingly, we do not reach this contention. 
 
* * * * * 
 
We have considered carefully all the contentions 
presented by the parties. Plaintiffs have demonstrated that this 
case can proceed as a class action. Comcast has not carried its 
burden to convince us otherwise. Accordingly, we will 
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AFFIRM in all respects the District Court‘s Order certifying 
the class. 
1 
 
Behrend, et al. v. Comcast Corporation, et al.,  
No. 10-2865 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment part and 
dissenting in part 
 
I agree with the Majority‟s conclusion, though not its 
reasoning, with respect to the question of antitrust impact, and 
I therefore join in holding that the District Court did not abuse 
its discretion when it determined that Plaintiffs could 
establish antitrust impact through evidence common to a class 
comprising Comcast cable television customers in the 
Philadelphia DMA.
1
  But because I conclude that damages 
cannot be proven using evidence common to that entire class, 
I would vacate the certification order to the extent it provides 
for a single class as to proof of damages, and I would remand 
the case to the District Court to consider whether the class can 
be divided into subclasses for the purpose of proving 
damages.  I therefore respectfully dissent in part.
2
 
                                              
1
 I adopt the defined terms, such as “DMA,” as used in 
the Majority opinion. 
2
 Although the Majority opinion decides the question 
of certification for a single class comprising Comcast 
customers in the Philadelphia DMA, it should be noted that 
its decision will become a template for resolving similar class 
certification questions pending in cases involving the Chicago 
and Boston media markets (see Slip Op. at 10 & n.5), and in 
all likelihood it will be cited in other lawsuits against cable 
television service providers (cf. App. at 3652 (Williams Dec.) 
(explaining that, as part of Comcast‟s swaps and acquisitions, 
“Adelphia received Comcast‟s cable systems and subscribers 
 
2 
 
As the Majority explains, Plaintiffs‟ claims have three 
elements, (1) an antitrust violation, (2) antitrust impact, and 
(3) damages (see Slip Op. at 17 (citing In re Hydrogen 
Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 2008)).
3
  
In pursuing its motion to decertify the initial class, however, 
Comcast effectively conceded that there was predominance 
with respect to the element of an antitrust violation, 
stipulating that it was contesting only “the Rule 23(b) issues 
of predominance of the common issues of (1) antitrust impact 
and (2) methodology of damages.”  (App. at 438.)  When the 
                                                                                                     
located in Palm Beach, Florida and Los Angeles, 
California”)).  Thus, the problems in the Majority‟s reasoning 
will have practical repercussions far beyond this case.  I 
therefore write not only because I cannot join the Majority in 
permitting Plaintiffs to pursue damages on a class-wide basis, 
but also to provide a counterpoint to the Majority‟s analysis 
for future consideration. 
3
 Plaintiffs make separate claims for violation of both § 
1 and § 2 of the Sherman Act, but each of those claims 
contains the three elements described above, with only the 
nature of the particular antitrust violation differing.  Compare 
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311 (listing the elements of a 
§ 1 claim as “(1) a violation of the antitrust laws – here, § 1 of 
the Sherman Act, (2) individual injury resulting from that 
violation, and (3) measurable damages”), with Am. Bearing 
Co. v. Litton Indus., 729 F.2d 943, 948 (3d Cir. 1984) (listing 
the elements of a § 2 claim as “(1) an antitrust violation, in 
this case a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act; (2) fact 
of damage or injury; and (3) measurable damages”). 
3 
 
District Court granted Comcast‟s motion,4 it accepted that 
stipulation and instructed the parties that, moving forward, 
they “need only address these discrete issues.”  (Id.)  On 
appeal, after the District Court once more certified a class, 
Comcast has again limited its arguments to addressing 
predominance as to impact and damages.  We are therefore 
faced with two related questions:  First, whether the District 
Court abused its discretion by holding that, as required by 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), common issues of 
law or fact predominate with respect to the question of 
antitrust impact, and, second, whether the District Court 
abused its discretion by likewise holding that common issues 
of law or fact predominate with respect to the question of 
damages.
5
   
                                              
4
 Because Comcast had moved to decertify the class 
entirely before stipulating to all issues other than the 
predominance questions described above, the District Court, 
which construed the motion to decertify as a motion for 
reconsideration, granted the motion only with respect to those 
predominance issues and denied it with respect to all other 
issues.  (App. at 437.)  
5
 While not expressed, the requirement that there must 
be predominance with respect to both antitrust impact and 
damages appears to be accepted by the parties and the 
Majority, and I likewise accept that predominance is issue 
specific.  See, e.g., Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d 305 at 311 
(“We examine the elements of plaintiffs‟ claim through the 
prism of Rule 23,” to determine whether “proof of the 
essential elements of the cause of action requires individual 
treatment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Newton v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 
 
4 
 
The Majority opinion skillfully lays out the legal 
requirements for predominance and the standard under which 
we must review the District Court‟s decision, and there is no 
need to repeat that legal background.  I emphasize, however, 
the instruction from Hydrogen Peroxide that the question of 
predominance hinges on whether the elements of a class 
claim are “capable of proof at trial through evidence that is 
common to the class rather than individual to its members.”  
552 F.3d at 311-12.  With that requirement in mind, I address 
the contested elements in turn. 
 
                                                                                                     
172 (3d Cir. 2001) (“To determine whether the claims alleged 
by the putative class meet the requirements for class 
certification, we must first examine the underlying cause of 
action … .  If proof of the essential elements of the cause of 
action requires individual treatment, then class certification is 
unsuitable.”)  Of course, where only some elements of a 
claim require individual treatment, while others can be 
litigated collectively, it may be appropriate to certify a class 
for those elements that can be treated collectively, while 
certifying subclasses or requiring individual treatment for 
those that cannot.  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(4), advisory 
committee‟s notes (explaining that application of Rule 
23(c)(4)‟s provision allowing “that an action may be 
maintained as a class action as to particular issues only” may 
be appropriate where, for instance, liability can be proven 
class wide, but damages cannot); In re Nassau Cnty. Strip 
Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 231 (2d Cir. 2006) (remanding 
to district court with instructions to certify a class for liability 
and to consider whether to also certify for damages or to, 
alternatively, certify subclasses for damages). 
5 
 
I. Whether Antitrust Impact Can Be Proven Using 
Evidence Common To The Class 
 
In seeking class certification, Plaintiffs initially 
presented four theories of antitrust impact.
6
  The District 
Court rejected three of them,
7
 leaving Plaintiffs with only a 
single theory of antitrust impact: that Comcast‟s clustering 
                                              
6
 Those theories were: (1) that Comcast‟s high market 
share resulting from clustering made it profitable for Comcast 
to deny Comcast SportsNet to DBS providers, which lowered 
DBS penetration rates and allowed Comcast to raise prices; 
(2) that Comcast‟s clustering reduced “benchmark 
competition” (the ability of customers to compare service and 
prices among competing providers), which allowed Comcast 
to raise prices; (3) that Comcast‟s market power increased its 
bargaining power vis-à-vis content providers, which allowed 
it to raise prices for its services; and (4) that Comcast‟s 
clustering deterred competition from overbuilders, allowing 
Comcast to raise prices. 
7
 The District Court rejected the theory that clustering 
reduced DBS penetration because it found that Comcast‟s 
denial of Comcast SportsNet to DBS providers predated and 
was unrelated to clustering.  It rejected the theory that 
clustering reduced benchmark competition because Plaintiffs 
had provided no evidence that television consumers actually 
engaged in benchmark competition.  It rejected as “wholly 
unsupported” the theory that increased bargaining power vis-
à-vis content providers increased prices. 
6 
 
reduced overbuilding
8
 and, therefore, increased prices.  Like 
the Majority, I see no abuse of discretion in the District 
Court‟s holding that antitrust impact may be proven using 
evidence that clustering reduced overbuilding and so caused 
increased prices.  Thus, I agree with my colleagues in the 
Majority that the element of antitrust impact is at least 
capable of proof on behalf of some class of consumers.  The 
more complicated question, as I see it, is whether antitrust 
impact is capable of proof for a class encompassing all 
Comcast customers in the Philadelphia DMA, through the use 
of common evidence.
 9
  On that issue too I agree with the 
Majority‟s holding that the District Court was within its 
discretion to conclude that the Philadelphia DMA is the 
                                              
8
 “Overbuilding,” as the Majority explained, is where a 
second cable provider – the “overbuilder” – “builds and offers 
customers a competitive alternative where a 
telecommunications company already operates.”  (Slip Op. at 
9.)  The existing provider is often referred to as the 
“incumbent” provider. 
9
 The geographic scope of the class is actually defined 
as Comcast‟s Philadelphia cluster, which, as noted by the 
Majority, excludes the DMA counties of Lehigh and 
Northampton.  As Dr. Chipty explains, those are the two 
counties in which Comcast has no presence (see App. at 3795 
& n.12 (Chipty Reply Dec.)), and, therefore, they would be 
excluded from the class regardless of its geographic scope.  
For ease of reference, I refer to the class as encompassing the 
Philadelphia DMA, rather than the Philadelphia Cluster, 
recognizing that those DMA counties in which there are no 
Comcast customers are not included in the class. 
7 
 
appropriate geographic region within which antitrust impact 
can be proven with common evidence.  I do not agree, 
however, with the Majority‟s reasoning in support of that 
conclusion.   
 
Much confusion has been caused in this case by the 
conflation of two distinct concepts: the antitrust concept of 
“relevant geographic market,” which has traditionally been 
defined as the smallest area within which a monopolist can 
exercise market power,
10
 and the class action concept of a 
“class definition,” which gives the parameters of a set of 
plaintiffs as to whom the elements of a claim can be proven 
using common evidence.
11
  Because, in this case, the class 
                                              
10
 For example, the Federal Trade Commission defines 
“relevant geographic market” as the region in which a 
hypothetical monopolist “would impose at least a [small but 
significant nontransitory price increase] on some customers in 
that region” without “this price increase [being] defeated by 
substitution away from the relevant product  or by … 
customers in the region travelling outside it to purchase the 
relevant product.”  FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 14-15 (2010).  Cf. 
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW § 5-30 (2010) (“[T]he 
relevant inquiry” for identifying a geographic market is “how 
far [customers] are willing to travel in order to avoid paying 
the defendant monopoly prices.”). 
11
 See In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 639 
n.22 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that, pursuant to Rule 
23(c)(1)(B), the class definition describes both “which 
individuals and entities are included” and the “claims, issues 
 
8 
 
definition includes a geographic component, the term 
“relevant geographic market” has been used equivocally by 
the parties, the District Court, and the Majority to describe 
both the area affected by antitrust impact and the area within 
which potential class members reside – the latter area being 
what I will call, for lack of a better term, the “class region.”12  
The problem with that equivocal usage is that the relevant 
geographic market and the class region are not necessarily 
coterminous.  Even if we assume that, within the Philadelphia 
DMA, there are many distinct geographic markets that are 
relevant for antitrust purposes, as Comcast argues, that does 
not mean that Plaintiffs cannot prove, by common evidence, 
                                                                                                     
or defenses to be treated on a class basis”).  While Rule 
23(c)(1)(B) does not expressly state that the class should 
include only those for whom the defined claims can be 
proven by common evidence, it is apparent that any class 
must be defined in a manner consistent with all Rule 23 
requirements, including commonality and predominance.  Cf. 
id. at 639 & n.22 (explaining that the question of whether 
there was predominance when it was alleged that some 
members of a proposed class “would be unable to 
demonstrate loss causation,” was an issue of “which 
individuals and entities are included in the putative class … 
primarily relevant to class definition”).  
12
 The class region will not necessarily be the same 
with respect to each element of a class‟s claims.  In fact, even 
in this case, the class region differs with respect to antitrust 
impact and damages because, for the reasons I identify infra 
Part II(B), antitrust impact can be proven using common 
evidence across a wider region than damages can be. 
9 
 
that Comcast‟s acts caused antitrust impact within all of them.  
As a theoretical matter, class proof can cover multiple 
relevant geographic markets, and, indeed, other Courts of 
Appeals have so held.  See, e.g., In re Sugar Antitrust Litig., 
559 F.2d 481, 483-84 (9th Cir. 1977) (rejecting the argument 
that a class could not be certified “where the antitrust claims 
involve a variety of geographic and product markets”); 
Windham v. Am. Brands Inc., 539 F.2d 1016, 1018 (4th Cir. 
1976) (holding that a district court abused its discretion in 
refusing to certify an antitrust class that encompassed “11 
different geographic markets”). 
 
While the relevant geographic market and the class 
region are conceptually distinct,
13
 the Majority, like the 
District Court, initially attempts to identify the class region in 
terms of the relevant geographic market.  Unlike the District 
Court, however, the Majority decides that because “[d]efining 
the relevant geographic market … is an issue of the merits,” 
the question of the relevant geographic market is “not 
properly before us.”  (Slip Op. at 20-21.) 
 
The Majority is correct that defining the relevant 
geographic market is not a task we need to undertake at this 
stage, but that is not because the task takes us into the merits.  
It is rather because, regardless of whether there are one or 
many relevant geographic markets associated with the 
                                              
13
 That is not to say that a class region and a relevant 
geographic market will always be different.  An antitrust 
violation may often affect people in only a single geographic 
market, in which case the relevant geographic market and the 
class region would be in essence the same.   
10 
 
Philadelphia DMA, the question before us at this juncture is 
whether there is some class, in this case defined 
geographically, that can be shown, through common 
evidence, to have experienced elevated prices as a result of 
reduced overbuilding because of Comcast‟s clustering.  
Should that region include only those franchise areas 
involved in the Cable System Transactions?
14
  Should it 
include only those franchise areas in which RCN was licensed 
to overbuild, but did not?  Should it encompass the 
Philadelphia DMA or some lesser or greater area?  The 
Majority does not ask those questions, but, instead, after 
determining that Plaintiffs can attempt to prove that the 
relevant geographic market is the Philadelphia DMA, the 
Majority assumes that that also means that the class is 
properly defined to cover the Philadelphia DMA and, 
therefore, that Plaintiffs can prove by common evidence that 
clustering reduced overbuilding and increased prices 
throughout the DMA.  (See, e.g., Slip Op. at 51-52 n.16 
(dismissing Comcast‟s argument that overbuilding should be 
analyzed at the franchise level because “Plaintiffs have 
established that the relevant geographic market can be the 
Philadelphia DMA”).)  Fortunately, what the Majority 
assumes, namely that the Philadelphia DMA is the 
                                              
14
 The Cable System Transactions are, as described by 
the Majority, the transactions through which Comcast 
“clustered” its franchise areas by “contract[ing] with 
competing cable providers to either acquire them or to „swap‟ 
cable systems it owned in areas outside the Philadelphia 
DMA for cable systems within the Philadelphia DMA.”  
(Slip. Op. at 5.) 
11 
 
appropriate class region for proving antitrust impact, is 
supportable. 
 
A compelling argument could be made that the class 
should consist only of those people living in franchise areas 
where RCN was licensed to overbuild, because only those 
franchise areas that would otherwise have been overbuilt 
could have been affected by the elimination of that 
overbuilding.
15
  Because RCN was licensed to overbuild only 
five of the eighteen Philadelphia DMA counties (see, e.g., 
                                              
15
 At least, Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that 
persons outside of franchise areas that would otherwise have 
been overbuilt can be affected by the elimination of that 
overbuilding.  Dr. Williams opines that, where some parts of 
a franchise area are overbuilt, the overbuilding can affect 
prices in other parts of that same franchise area that are not 
overbuilt.  (App. at 3704-14 (Williams Dec.) (explaining that 
where competing cable companies have “alternating franchise 
areas,” overbuilding by one company into portions of the 
competitor‟s adjacent franchise area can affect prices in the 
portion of the overbuilt franchise area “that remain 
monopolized”).)  As a theoretical matter, it is also plausible 
that, when one franchise area has been overbuilt, the threat of 
further expansion by that overbuilder could put downward 
pressure on prices in nearby franchise areas.  If such an effect 
is described in the multitude of expert opinions, however, the 
parties have not identified it.  Moreover, even if there is such 
an effect, it would likely be attenuated by distance.  It seems 
doubtful that overbuilding in, for instance, Bucks County, 
Pennsylvania would influence prices in Kent County, 
Delaware. 
12 
 
App. at 3640 (Williams Dec.); App. at 4284-85 (Singer Reply 
Dec.)), that would suggest limiting the class region to those 
five counties.
16
  Nonetheless, both Dr. Williams and Dr. 
Singer opined that, had RCN successfully overbuilt the five 
counties in which it was already licensed, it would have 
continued overbuilding into the remainder of the Philadelphia 
DMA.  (App. at 4285 (Singer Reply Dec.) (“[H]ad RCN 
entered the five counties that it intended to … it is likely that 
RCN would have expanded its footprint beyond those five 
counties into geographically contiguous areas throughout the 
Philadelphia DMA.”); App. at 4306 (Williams Reply Dec.) 
(“RCN likely would have continued to pursue its strategy of 
building into other areas in the Philadelphia DMA adjacent to 
its existing cable infrastructure, beyond the five counties.”).)  
The District Court relied on those statements in holding that 
Plaintiffs had shown that the anticompetitive effects of 
clustering could be proven throughout the Philadelphia DMA.  
Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 264 F.R.D. 150, 174-75 (E.D. Pa. 
2010).  Though one may be skeptical that RCN would have 
overbuilt even the five counties in which it was licensed, let 
alone the remainder of the Philadelphia DMA, it was not 
clearly erroneous for the District Court to accept that the 
prospect of overbuilding throughout the DMA was capable of 
proof.  Consequently, it was not an abuse of discretion for the 
District Court to hold that Plaintiffs could show, by common 
evidence, the antitrust impact of clustering throughout the 
                                              
16
 Given that the Class‟s whole theory is rooted in the 
premise that Comcast‟s clustering deterred overbuilding, it is 
no small matter that RCN – the only entity licensed to 
overbuild anywhere in the Philadelphia DMA – was licensed 
to overbuild in just five of the eighteen counties. 
13 
 
Philadelphia DMA.  Accordingly, while I do not agree with 
the Majority‟s reasoning, I agree that the District Court was 
within its discretion in determining that an appropriate class 
region for proving antitrust impact is the Philadelphia 
DMA.
17
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 The Majority responds to my efforts to identify the 
class region by stating that I have “misunderst[ood] an 
important distinction,” namely that Plaintiffs have identified a 
“„class region‟ … of a „Philadelphia cluster‟ which is distinct 
from the contested relevant geographic market of the 
“„Philadelphia DMA.‟”  (Slip Op. at 26 n.8.)  I do 
acknowledge that distinction.  However, that does not speak 
to the point because, in spite of that distinction, there remains 
an equivocal use of the term “relevant geographic market.”  
That equivocation is evidenced by the Majority‟s statement – 
in response to Comcast‟s suggestion that franchise areas 
might be the appropriate class region for damages – that 
“Comcast is attempting to redefine the relevant market: 
inasmuch as Plaintiffs have established that the relevant 
geographic market can be the Philadelphia DMA … their 
damages model passes muster.”  (Slip. Op. at 51-52 n.16.) 
The Majority also asserts that there is no question 
about the class region because Comcast does not dispute the 
class region but disputes only the relevant geographic market.  
(Slip Op. at 26 n.8)  That is not correct.  While Comcast does 
not use the term “class region,” Comcast and its experts 
plainly argue that the scope of the class is too broad, and they 
dispute the District Court‟s conclusion that antitrust impact 
can be proven by common evidence across the Philadelphia 
DMA.  (See, e.g, App. at 3923 (Teece Reply Dec.) (“[E]ven if 
RCN would have overbuilt all five counties entirely in the 
 
14 
 
                                                                                                     
but-for world, this would not be sufficient to conclude that the 
impact of the challenged conduct would have affected all 
Comcast customers in the Philadelphia DMA.”); id. at 3922 
(“I have seen no evidence that RCN ever intended to build out 
the entire Philadelphia DMA.”); Appellants Br. at 33 (arguing 
that Dr. Williams‟s models do not show that clustering 
“deterred overbuilding … in a manner affecting all class 
members”); id. at 24-25 (noting that RCN was licensed in 
only five counties and arguing that Plaintiffs cannot prove 
that RCN would have entered the Philadelphia DMA).  While 
I do not agree with Comcast‟s effort to define the class region 
by reference to the relevant geographic market (any more 
than I agree with the Majority‟s conflating of those concepts), 
to say that Comcast does not dispute the contours of the class 
region is not accurate, as the foregoing citations indicate. 
However, even if Comcast had not disputed the class 
region, it would still be appropriate for us to address it.  The 
Majority faults me for, in its view, addressing problems not 
raised by Comcast, which the Majority asserts are, therefore, 
waived.  (See, e.g., slip op. at 43-44 n.15 (“[T]he 
Concurrence-Dissent … raises multiple arguments … not 
addressed by Comcast‟s expert … .  We must limit our 
review to the issues presented by Appellants and 
Appellees.”).  But “there can be no waiver … of the Judge‟s 
duty to apply the correct legal standard. … This is particularly 
true in the class action context, where „the district court acts 
as a fiduciary who must serve as a guardian of the rights of 
absent class members.‟”  In re Cmty. Bank of N. Virginia, 622 
F.3d 275, 302 n.20 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. 
Ali, 508 F.3d 136, 144 n.9 (3d Cir. 2007) and In re General 
Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods Liab. Litig., 55 
 
15 
 
 
                                                                                                     
F.3d 768, 785 (3d Cir. 1995)).  Thus, where Comcast has 
raised the issues of whether there is predominance with 
respect to antitrust impact and damages, we are required to 
“apply the correct legal standard,” – which is to determine 
whether those elements can, in fact, be proven using evidence 
common to the class – even if that requires us “„to conduct 
[our] own thorough [R]ule 23[b] inquiry.‟”  Id. (quoting 
Sitrman v. Exxon Corp., 280 F.3d 554, 563 n.7 (5th Cir. 
2002)).  By disregarding the problems I have endeavored to 
identify, the result is an overly broad class definition and, to 
the extent any legitimate claims are proven, a likely dilution 
of recovery.  Our fiduciary responsibility to absent class 
members requires that we ensure compliance with the 
provisions of Rule 23, especially those “„designed to protect 
absentees by blocking unwarranted or overbroad class 
definitions.‟”  Id. at 291 (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997)); cf. Tri-M Group, LLC v. 
Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 416 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[T]he waiver 
principle is only a rule of practice and may be relaxed 
whenever the public interest or justice so warrants.”). 
Moreover, we must be cognizant of “the pivotal status 
of class certification in large-scale litigation,” which is “often 
the defining moment in class actions (for it may sound the 
„death knell‟ of the litigation on the part of plaintiffs, or 
create unwarranted pressure to settle nonmeritorious claims 
on the part of defendants).”  Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 
310 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Pointing out 
analytical problems central to the certification question is no 
frolic and detour.  It is our obligation. 
16 
 
II. Whether Damages Can Be Proven Using Evidence 
Common To The Class 
 
I part ways with the Majority entirely, however, when 
it comes to class-wide proof of damages.  The only evidence 
supporting Plaintiffs‟ claim that damages can be proven using 
evidence common to the class is the expert opinion of Dr. 
McClave.  But, as detailed hereafter, Dr. McClave‟s 
testimony is incapable of identifying any damages caused by 
reduced overbuilding in the Philadelphia DMA.  
Consequently, his testimony is irrelevant and should be 
inadmissible at trial, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 
702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 
U.S. 579 (1993), as lacking fit.  Thus, it cannot constitute 
common evidence of damages.
18
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 Although we have never explicitly held that expert 
testimony must satisfy Daubert at the class certification stage, 
it is implicit in both Supreme Court precedent and our 
precedent.  In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme 
Court recently expressed its “doubt” about a district court‟s 
conclusion that “Daubert did not apply to expert testimony at 
the certification stage of class-action proceedings.”  131 S. 
Ct. 2541, 2553-54 (2011).  In Hydrogen Peroxide, we 
explained that “opinion testimony should not be uncritically 
accepted as establishing a Rule 23 requirement merely 
because the court holds the testimony should not be excluded, 
under Daubert or for any other reason.”  552 F.3d at 323.  
Inherent in that statement is the conclusion that a court could, 
at the class certification stage, exclude expert testimony under 
Daubert.   
 
17 
 
                                                                                                     
Even without the guidance of Dukes and Hydrogen 
Peroxide, simple logic indicates that a court may consider the 
admissibility of expert testimony at least when considering 
predominance.  A court should be hard pressed to conclude 
that the elements of a claim are capable of proof through 
evidence common to a class if the only evidence proffered 
would not be admissible as proof of anything. 
I recognize, of course, that in neither the District Court 
nor before us did Comcast describe its challenge to 
certification as a challenge to the admissibility of Dr. 
McClave‟s testimony.  Nonetheless, while it did not use the 
language of Daubert, the substance of Comcast‟s challenge 
was that Dr. McClave‟s damages testimony was irrelevant 
and, therefore, did not fit the case.  (See, e.g., Appellants‟ Br. 
at 37 (“Dr. McClave admitted that his damages model takes 
all of the anticompetitive effects of all of the complained-of 
conduct as a whole, and therefore cannot isolate damages 
attributable to specific conduct or effects.”); id. at 42 (“Dr. 
McClave‟s DBS penetration screen is substantively invalid 
because it bears no relation to the competitive conditions that 
would have prevailed in the Philadelphia region.”); id. at 43 
(“Dr. McClave‟s „market share‟ screen is likewise invalid 
because it bears no relation to the competitive conditions that 
would have prevailed in the Philadelphia region.”).  The 
Majority protests my invocation of Daubert, but, regardless 
of whether we frame the issue as a question of fit under 
Daubert or simply ask whether the District Court abused its 
discretion by relying on irrelevant evidence, we are 
effectively asking the same question.  I have chosen the 
terminology of Daubert because it is particularly apt for 
describing the difficulty created by the change in Plaintiffs‟ 
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theory of impact and the consequent disconnect between that 
altered theory and Dr. McClave‟s expert report.  The short of 
it is, Dr. McClave‟s model no longer fits the case.  This 
observation is not, as the Majority fears, either an invitation 
or a demand for mini-trials in conjunction with class 
certification motions. 
I note here as well my disagreement with the 
Majority‟s claim that, at the class certification stage, we need 
only “evaluate expert models to determine whether the theory 
of proof is plausible.”  (Slip Op. at 47 n.13.)  The Majority 
supports that position by quoting Hydrogen Peroxide’s 
statement that “„if such impact is plausible in theory, it is also 
susceptible to proof at trial through available evidence 
common to the class.‟”  (Id. (quoting Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 
F.3d at 325).)   That quotation is better understood, however, 
if one includes the first half of the quoted sentence, which 
states that “the question at class certification is whether, if 
such impact is plausible in theory, it is also susceptible to 
proof at trial through available evidence common to the 
class.”  552 F.3d at 325 (emphasis added).  Thus, Hydrogen 
Peroxide does not suggest that we need only “evaluate expert 
models to determine whether the theory of proof is plausible,” 
as the Majority claims.  To the contrary, Hydrogen Peroxide 
instructs that, even where a theory is plausible, “the question 
at class certification is whether” that plausible theory is 
susceptible to common proof.  Id.  If the only common proof 
offered is inadmissible expert testimony, then Plaintiffs have 
not met their burden of showing that the theory – plausible or 
not – is capable of common proof. 
19 
 
Our precedent explains that Rule 702 and Daubert 
impose three requirements for admission of expert testimony: 
the expert must be qualified, the expert‟s methodology must 
be reliable, and the expert‟s proffered testimony must fit the 
particular case.  See United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 172 
(3d Cir. 2010).  Testimony fits when it “„is sufficiently tied to 
the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a 
factual dispute.‟”  Id. at 173 (quoting United States v. 
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985)).  Like any 
relevancy determination, the question of fit is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion.  United States v. Ford, 481 F.3d 215, 
217-18.  Here, Dr. McClave‟s opinion fails the requirement of 
“fit” because it is disconnected from Plaintiffs‟ only viable 
theory of antitrust impact, i.e., reduced overbuilding, and, 
thus, the proffered expert testimony cannot help the jury 
determine whether reduced overbuilding caused damages.
19
  
It was, consequently, an abuse of discretion for the District 
Court to consider Dr. McClave‟s opinion as demonstrating 
that damages could be proven using evidence common to the 
class. 
 
As explained by the Majority, Dr. McClave arrived at 
his damages calculation by comparing actual cable prices in 
the Philadelphia DMA to prices in benchmark counties 
outside the Philadelphia DMA.  By making those 
comparisons, Dr. McClave sought to identify the “but for” 
price of cable – that is the price that would have prevailed in 
the Philadelphia DMA but for the alleged anticompetitive 
                                              
19
 I need not, and do not, question whether Dr. 
McClave is qualified as an expert or whether his methodology 
is reliable. 
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conduct of Comcast.  (App. at 3407 (McClave Dec.).)  For 
that comparison to be relevant, however, Dr. McClave‟s 
benchmark counties must reflect the conditions that would 
have prevailed in the Philadelphia DMA in the absence of any 
impact from that conduct.  (Cf. App. at 719 (McClave Cross) 
(stating that the goal of his bechmarking model was to 
identify “counties that reflect characteristics that one would 
find absent … the effects of [Comcast‟s alleged 
anticompetitive] conduct”).)  And because the only surviving 
theory of antitrust impact is that clustering reduced 
overbuilding, for Dr. McClave‟s comparison to be relevant, 
his benchmark counties must reflect the conditions that would 
have prevailed in the Philadelphia DMA but for the alleged 
reduction in overbuilding.  In all respects unrelated to reduced 
overbuilding, the benchmark counties should reflect the 
actual conditions in the Philadelphia DMA, or else the model 
will identify “damages” that are not the result of reduced 
overbuilding, or, in other words, that “are not the certain 
result of the wrong.”  Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson 
Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931); see also, 
e.g., Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338, 
1353 (3d Cir. 1975) (“„The rule which precludes the recovery 
of uncertain damages applies to such as are not the certain 
result of the wrong.‟” (quoting Story Parchment, 282 U.S. at 
562)); Amerinet, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 972 F.2d 1483, 1494 
(8th Cir. 1992) (same); Broan Mfg. Co. v. Associated Distrib., 
Inc., 923 F.2d 1232, 1235 (6th Cir. 1991) (same). 
 
Dr. McClave‟s benchmark counties fail in that regard 
because he formulated his model at a time when Plaintiffs had 
four separate theories of antitrust impact, and so he did not 
select his benchmark counties to isolate the impact of reduced 
overbuilding.  He chose them, as one would expect, to reflect 
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the impact of other conditions in addition to reduced 
overbuilding.  Consequently, as described in greater detail 
below, once the District Court rejected Plaintiffs‟ other 
theories of antitrust impact – leaving only the reduced-
overbuilding theory – Dr. McClave‟s model no longer fits 
Plaintiffs‟ sole theory of antitrust impact and, instead, 
produces damages calculations that “are not the certain result 
of the wrong.”  Story Parchment, 282 U.S. at 562.20 
 
A. Dr. McClave’s Benchmark Counties Do Not 
Reflect “But For” Conditions in the 
Philadelphia DMA 
 
To identify his benchmark counties, Dr. McClave used 
three “screens.”  First, he screened for counties where 
Comcast‟s market share was “less than 40%,” because that 
figure identified “markets where Comcast is likely to have 
less market power than it has acquired in the Philadelphia 
market.”  (App. at 3410 (McClave Dec.).)  Second, he 
screened for counties where DBS penetration
21
 was “at or 
above the national average” because “DBS … penetration 
                                              
20
 Whether Dr. McClave‟s opinion would have fit had 
the District Court allowed Plaintiffs to pursue all four of their 
theories of antitrust impact is irrelevant at this point. 
21
 As noted by the Majority, “DBS” stands for “direct 
broadcast satellite” television service.  (Slip Op. at 27.)  Dr. 
McClave actually used penetration rates for all alternative 
delivery systems (“ADS”), rather than just DBS systems.  He 
opined, however, and the parties seem to agree, that “ADS is 
a proxy for DBS penetration rates.”  (App. at 3410.) 
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was allegedly constrained by the anticompetitive behavior of 
Comcast.”  (Id.)  Third, having identified counties in which 
Comcast‟s share was less than 40 percent and DBS 
penetration was above the national average, Dr. McClave 
screened for overbuilding, identifying “each of the 
benchmark counties … as either overbuilt or not overbuilt.”  
(App. at 3411-12 (McClave Dec.).)  While those screens 
might, if properly employed, have helped identify relevant 
benchmark counties in a case involving antitrust impacts 
beyond limited overbuilding, they fail to identify the “but for” 
conditions that are relevant to what is now the only impact of 
Comcast‟s allegedly anticompetitive conduct, namely the 
deterrence of overbuilding.  They, therefore, cannot help 
identify damages caused by that impact.  I examine the 
screens in reverse order. 
 
 1. The Overbuilt Counties Screen 
 
While there are several problems in Dr. McClave‟s 
opinion that reflect the lack of fit, nothing demonstrates it 
with more certainty than this:  For thirteen of the eighteen 
counties in the Philadelphia DMA, Dr. McClave‟s opinion 
does not even attempt to show that there were elevated prices 
resulting from reduced overbuilding.  In fact, he assumes that 
there was no such effect.  
 
As noted above, after identifying his benchmark 
counties using the market share and DBS penetration screens, 
Dr. McClave used a third screen to divide those counties into 
two groups, identifying “each of the benchmark counties … 
23 
 
as either overbuilt or not overbuilt.”22  (App. at 3411-12 
(McClave Dec.).)  Having done so, Dr. McClave estimated 
“but for” competitive prices, by comparing, on a county by 
county basis, prices in the eighteen actual Philadelphia DMA 
counties to prices in either the “overbuilt” or “not overbuilt” 
benchmark counties, and – crucially – he did so “assum[ing] 
that only the five counties that RCN indicated it planned to 
enter as an overbuilder would have been overbuilt.”  (App. at 
3412 (McClave Dec.).)  At the outset, therefore, it is clear that 
Dr. McClave assumed that elevated prices resulting from 
                                              
22
 The Majority notes that the overbuilding screen is 
not mentioned by the parties or the District Court.  (Slip Op. 
at 52 n.17.)  While it is true that the parties do not use the 
terminology “overbuilding screen,” the District Court did 
indeed describe the concept to which I have given that label.  
See Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 182 (“Once a county qualified as 
a benchmark for a particular year by satisfying [the DBS 
penetration and market share screens], it was examined to 
determine whether or not it had been significantly 
overbuilt.”).  Whether one uses the “screen” terminology is 
not what is important.  Dr. McClave, in fact, does not 
describe any of the benchmarking criteria as “screens,” which 
is a term that appears to have been only later applied to his 
methods. 
Regardless of the terminology, the fact remains that 
Dr. McClave did screen for overbuilding in an attempt to 
account for elevated prices resulting from reduced 
overbuilding.  Thus, that screen cannot be ignored in any 
“rigorous analysis,” Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 318, of 
whether damages resulting from reduced overbuilding can be 
proven by common evidence. 
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reduced overbuilding would be present in only five of the 
eighteen Philadelphia counties.  Dr. McClave then explained 
that, after making his calculations, “the overbuilt factor 
indicate[d] lower prices [in his model] in counties where the 
overbuilding factor [was] present.”  (App. at 3422 (McClave 
Dec.) (emphasis added).)  Thus, Dr. McClave‟s model 
assumes that elevated prices from reduced overbuilding could 
be present only in the five counties “that RCN indicated it 
planned to enter,” and the model did, in fact, identify elevated 
prices from reduced overbuilding only in those counties.  
(App. at 3412, 22 (McClave Dec.).)  For the remaining 
counties, while there may be some uncertainty as to what 
exactly caused any elevated prices, this much is certain: the 
elevated prices identified by Dr. McClave in those thirteen 
counties were, according to Dr. McClave himself, the result 
of something other than reduced overbuilding.  Consequently, 
any “damages” identified by Dr. McClave with respect to 
those thirteen counties are “uncertain damages … [that] are 
not the certain result of [reduced overbuilding],” and “may be 
substantially attributable to lawful competition.”  Coleman 
Motor, 525 F.2d at 1353 (quoting Story Parchment, 282 U.S. 
at 562). 
 
Because Plaintiffs have been limited by the District 
Court to an overbuilding theory of antitrust impact, any price 
elevation resulting from a source other than reduced 
overbuilding is simply irrelevant.  Thus, not only have 
Plaintiffs failed to show that damages can be proven using 
evidence common to the class, they have failed to show, for 
thirteen counties in the Philadelphia DMA, that damages can 
be proven using any evidence whatsoever – common or 
otherwise.  Perhaps, in those other counties, there is a way to 
show damages resulting from reduced overbuilding, but, if so, 
25 
 
Plaintiffs have not identified it.  As the burden lies with 
Plaintiffs to establish predominance, that alone should compel 
us to vacate the District Court‟s certification order with 
respect to class-wide proof of damages.
23
 
 
2. The DBS Penetration Screen 
 
Dr. McClave screened for counties where DBS 
penetration was at or above the national average because 
“DBS … penetration was allegedly constrained by the 
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 The Majority states that, in criticizing Dr. 
McClave‟s model for identifying overbuilding damages in 
only five counties, I have “misse[d] the central theory of 
Plaintiffs‟ case: by deterring the entry of overbuilders through 
clustering, Comcast allegedly maintained higher prices across 
the entire market area.”  (Slip Op. at 50-51 n.15.)  This 
misperceives my reasoning.  I understand Plaintiffs‟ theory 
but have pointed out that the theory, as altered by the District 
Court‟s ruling, no longer matches Dr. McClave‟s opinion.  
More precisely, Plaintiffs‟ claim is that by reducing 
overbuilding “Comcast allegedly maintained higher prices 
across the entire market area,” (id.) whereas Dr. McClave 
attempts to show that, by reducing overbuilding, Comcast 
maintained higher prices in only the “five counties that RCN 
indicated it planned to enter as an overbuilder,” (App. at 3412 
(McClave Dec.)).  The Majority notes that this particular 
problem with Dr. McClave‟s damages theory was not 
identified by Comcast, but we ought note overlook significant 
problems with the class certification simply because they are 
ones we have identified rather than ones to which our 
attention has been directed. 
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anticompetitive behavior of Comcast.”  (App. at 3410 
(McClave Dec.).)  Using that screen would have been 
appropriate if, as Plaintiffs originally argued and as Dr. 
McClave was originally informed, DBS penetration had been 
constrained by Comcast‟s anticompetitive conduct.  But, as 
the District Court explicitly held, Plaintiffs failed to tie 
“Comcast‟s clustering activity in the Philadelphia DMA to 
reduced DBS penetration.”  Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 165.  
Consequently, there is no evidence in the record suggesting 
that DBS penetration in the Philadelphia DMA was in any 
way affected by Comcast‟s allegedly anticompetitive conduct.  
Rather, the District Court found that, while DBS penetration 
in Philadelphia was well below the national average, the 
cause of that reduced penetration – Comcast‟s refusal to 
distribute Comcast SportsNet through DBS providers – 
“occurred prior to the class period,” is “unrelated to 
clustering,” is “based upon valid business considerations” and 
is “specifically permitted” by the FCC.  Id. 
 
Therefore, while DBS penetration in the Philadelphia 
DMA is below the national average, the cause of that reduced 
rate predated and is unrelated to Comcast‟s clustering and, 
thus, even in the absence of Comcast‟s allegedly 
anticompetitive conduct, DBS penetration in the Philadelphia 
DMA would be no different than the below average rate that 
has actually prevailed.  As a result, any benchmark county 
used to identify “but for” conditions should use the actual 
DBS penetration rate from the Philadelphia DMA.  Dr. 
McClave, nonetheless, used the much higher national average 
27 
 
rate,
24
 which identified benchmark counties in which cable 
prices were lower than in counties having DBS penetration 
similar to that in the Philadelphia DMA.
25
  Because Dr. 
McClave then calculated damages by comparing prices in 
those benchmark counties (with national average DBS 
penetration and, therefore, lower prices) to actual prices in the 
Philadelphia counties (with below national average DBS 
penetration and, therefore, higher prices), at least a portion of 
Dr. McClave‟s damages calculation results from the 
Philadelphia DMA having below national average DBS 
penetration.  Since the cause of the below national average 
DBS penetration in the Philadelphia DMA is “unrelated to 
clustering,” is “based upon valid business considerations,” 
and is “specifically permitted” by the FCC, id., that reduced 
DBS penetration is the result of lawful competition, and, it 
follows, “[t]he damage figures advanced by [Dr. McClave] 
may be substantially attributable to lawful competition.”  
Coleman Motor, 525 F.2d at 1353. 
 
The Majority responds to this flaw only by stating that 
the DBS penetration screen was “included to estimate typical 
competitive market conditions, not to calculate liability for 
                                              
24
 According to Dr. McClave, national average DBS 
penetration during the six year period for which he calculated 
damages averaged 24.17%, whereas actual DBS penetration 
in the Philadelphia DMA averaged 12.77%.  (App. at 3411 
(McClave Dec.).) 
25
 The District Court discussed extensively the 
evidence that “DBS competition constrains cable prices.”  
Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 163-65. 
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the foreclosure of DBS competitors.”  (Slip Op. at 49.)  That 
explanation misses the mark.  In identifying benchmark 
counties for use in a damages analysis, the goal is not to 
identify “typical competitive market conditions.”  The goal is, 
and must be, to identify the conditions that would have 
existed “but for” Comcast‟s alleged anticompetitive conduct.  
In this case, even in the “but for” hypothetical world, the 
Philadelphia DMA would not have been typically 
competitive.  Rather, given the District Court‟s findings, there 
is no question that, as a result of Comcast‟s lawful 
competition, DBS penetration in the Philadelphia DMA 
would have been well below that present in a typical 
competitive market.  Thus, by comparing Philadelphia to 
benchmark counties having the much higher national average 
DBS penetration, Dr. McClave‟s model wrongly “calculate[s] 
liability for the foreclosure of DBS competitors,” (id.) 
imposing damages based on the prices that would have 
prevailed had Comcast not lawfully foreclosed DBS 
competition. 
 
3. The Market Share Screen 
 
Dr. McClave screened for counties where Comcast‟s 
market share was “less than 40%,” because that figure 
represented the midpoint between Comcast‟s 20 percent share 
before the class period and its 60 percent share during the 
class period and so identified “markets where Comcast is 
likely to have less market power than it has acquired in the 
Philadelphia market.”  (App. at 3410 (McClave Dec.).)  
Under Plaintiffs last viable theory of antitrust impact, 
however, while Comcast‟s market share is relevant to the 
question of whether there has been any reduction in 
overbuilding, it is not relevant – at least not in isolation – to 
29 
 
determining the damages caused by that reduction.  Instead, 
the relevant market share is the share that would have been 
held by any incumbent in the “but for” hypothetical world.  
 
As an illustration of that point, consider a hypothetical 
county with two equally sized franchise areas.  Assume that, 
prior to the class period, Comcast had a 100 percent share of 
one franchise area and that AT&T had a 100 percent share of 
the other, so that each had a 50 percent share of the county as 
a whole.  Assume further that, as part of its clustering efforts, 
Comcast acquired AT&T‟s franchise area so that, today, 
Comcast has a 100 percent share of the entire county.  To test 
the theory that clustering reduces overbuilding, a comparison 
between Comcast‟s current 100 percent share of the county 
and the 50 percent share that Comcast would have had but for 
its clustering would surely be relevant in determining whether 
clustering effected any reduction in overbuilding.   
 
Next, assume that, after making that comparison, 
Plaintiffs could show that, had no clustering taken place, 
RCN would have overbuilt 20 percent of each of the two 
franchise areas, so that, in the “but for” world, RCN would 
have a 20 percent share in each franchise area, and Comcast 
and AT&T would each have an 80 percent share in their 
respective franchise area.  Pursuant to Plaintiffs‟ only theory 
– that increased overbuilding decreases prices – any damages 
in that scenario arise solely from the difference between 
RCN‟s 20 percent share in the “but for” franchise areas and 
RCN‟s zero percent shares in the current franchise areas.  The 
damages resulting from that foregone overbuilding are the 
same whether, in the “but for” world, the remaining 80 
percent of the franchise in question would have been 
controlled by Comcast or by AT&T.  It follows, therefore, 
30 
 
that once the antitrust impact of Comcast‟s clustering – i.e., 
the reduction in overbuilding – has been identified and 
accounted for as part of an overbuilding screen, any market 
share screen applied to isolate the “but for” conditions that 
would have prevailed in the Philadelphia DMA should screen 
not just for Comcast‟s share, but for the share of whatever 
incumbent would have been present but for the clustering.
 26
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 Again, this is not to say that Comcast‟s market 
share, in particular, will never be relevant.  As just discussed, 
it is highly relevant for determining antitrust impact.  
Moreover, it might have been relevant to damages had the 
District Court not excluded three of Plaintiffs‟ theories of 
antitrust impact.  In fact, the market share screen appears to 
be another relic of the Plaintiffs‟ having initially presented 
four theories of impact.  One of those theories was that 
Comcast‟s increased market share increased its bargaining 
power and allowed it to reduce prices, Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 
178-81, and a second was that Comcast‟s increased market 
share reduced the ability of consumers to engage in 
benchmark pricing by comparing Comcast‟s prices to the 
prices of other cable providers in the region, id. at 175-78.  
Had either of those theories survived the class certification 
process, it might have made sense for Dr. McClave to screen 
for Comcast‟s market share, because, under those theories, 
Comcast‟s market share directly impacted price.  But the 
District Court rejected those theories, allowing Comcast to 
proceed only on a theory that clustering reduced overbuilding.  
Under that theory, what is relevant is the market share of all 
incumbent cable providers vis-a-vis overbuilders. 
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Because Dr. McClave‟s model already assumes that 
there has been a reduction in overbuilding and screens for it, 
the relevant market share for damages purposes is the share of 
the market maintained by any incumbent – regardless of the 
identity of the particular incumbent.  By calculating the 
appropriate market share screen using only Comcast‟s 
average share throughout the Philadelphia DMA, Dr. 
McClave has ignored any market share that, in the “but for” 
hypothetical world, would have been maintained by an 
incumbent other than Comcast.  For franchise areas where 
Comcast was not present prior to the class period, Dr. 
McClave should have calculated damages by comparing 
Comcast‟s current share to the “but for” share that would 
have been held by any incumbents Comcast replaced.  
Because he instead effectively calculated damages by 
comparing Comcast‟s current share to Comcast‟s zero percent 
share prior to the class period,
27
 he unfairly suppressed the 
relevant incumbent share and artificially inflated the damages 
calculation. 
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 I say he “effectively calculated damages” that way 
because Dr. McClave did not actually make a franchise by 
franchise comparison, which, as discussed infra Part II(B), is 
itself problematic.  He instead calculated Comcast‟s market 
share by averaging its share throughout the Philadelphia 
DMA.  But, because he included in that average Comcast‟s 
zero percent share in the franchises in which it had not been 
present prior to the class period, instead of including the share 
held by the incumbent Comcast replaced, it is fair to say that 
he effectively calculated damages by comparing Comcast‟s 
actual share in those franchise areas to Comcast‟s zero 
percent share prior to the class period. 
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Because none of Dr. McClave‟s screens reflect the 
conditions that would have prevailed in the Philadelphia 
DMA “but for” any reduction in overbuilding, the damages 
Dr. McClave calculated are “not the certain result of the 
wrong,” Story Parchment, 282 U.S. at 562.  Accordingly, Dr. 
McClave‟s opinion cannot help a jury determine damages, 
and so would be inadmissible at trial for lacking fit.  Because 
Dr. McClave‟s opinion is the only evidence Plaintiffs have 
offered to meet their burden of showing that damages can be 
proven using evidence common to the class, I would vacate 
the District Court‟s class certification with respect to class-
wide proof of damages.
28
 
                                              
28
 The Majority suggests that any problems with Dr. 
McClave‟s screens are “attacks on the merits of the 
methodology that have no place in the class certification 
inquiry,” because, “[e]ven if we were to overrule as clearly 
erroneous the District Court‟s findings on all four contested 
pieces of Dr. McClave‟s methodology – i.e., modify both of 
Dr. McClave‟s screens … only the final amount of estimated 
damages would change.”  (Slip Op. at 52.)  I disagree.  First, 
the problems I have identified with Dr. McClave‟s screens 
call into question not only the amount of damages but also 
whether there are any means of proving damages at all in 
thirteen of the eighteen Philadelphia DMA counties.  See 
supra Part II(A)(1).  Second, if Dr. McClave‟s model does 
not presently constitute a relevant means of calculating class-
wide damages, to say that the model might be fixed, for 
example by “modify[ing] both of Dr. McClave‟s screens,” 
(Slip Op. at 52), is no better than saying that Plaintiffs have 
made “a threshold showing” of predominance or shown a 
sufficient “intention to try the case in a manner that satisfies 
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B. Damages Are Not Capable of Being Proven 
By Evidence Common to the Entire Class 
 
While my thoughts thus far have focused on why 
Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that damages 
can be proven using evidence common to the class, none of 
the problems I have noted are necessarily irreparable.  That is, 
Dr. McClave could conceivably redesign his model to address 
overbuilding throughout the Philadelphia DMA, to use actual 
DBS penetration rates, and to screen for the market share of 
all incumbents, not just Comcast.  Nevertheless, there remains 
an intractable problem with any model purporting to calculate 
damages for all class members collectively.  
 
Central to Dr. McClave‟s damages model is the 
conclusion that the price of cable television service in any 
given franchise area is affected by the relative market shares 
of at least three entities: overbuilders, DBS providers, and 
incumbent cable providers.  All else being equal, for example, 
                                                                                                     
the predominance requirement” – both of which are 
insufficient under Hydrogen Peroxide.  552 F.3d at 321 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Plaintiffs have the burden 
of establishing predominance and, until they have actually 
proffered a model that shows how damages can be calculated 
on a class-wide basis, they have not met that burden – 
particularly when the only evidence they have offered should 
be entirely inadmissible.  The Majority‟s willingness to 
overlook the debilitating flaws in Dr. McClave‟s model in an 
effort to avoid an “attack on the merits,” is precisely the kind 
talismanic invocation of “concern for merits-avoidance” that 
Hydrogen Peroxide forbids.  Id. at 317 n.17. 
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areas that are overbuilt will have lower prices than areas that 
are not overbuilt, and areas with high DBS penetration will 
have lower prices than areas with low DBS penetration.  For 
that reason, Dr. McClave‟s model identifies benchmark 
counties by screening for the relative market shares of those 
three entities.
29
  While I do not accept the manner in which 
Dr. McClave has measured the relative shares of those 
entities in the “but for” Philadelphia DMA, I accept the 
premise that the relative shares have significant influence on 
the price of cable television service. 
 
If price does vary with the changes in relative share 
within a franchise area, however, it is hard to see how those 
650 franchise areas
30
 can simply be treated as average for 
purposes of proving damages.  The record indicates that, on 
the contrary, the “but for” market shares of overbuilders, DBS 
providers, and incumbent providers would vary, sometimes 
significantly, from franchise area to franchise area. 
 
Addressing overbuilding first, RCN – the only party 
licensed to overbuild any part of the Philadelphia DMA – was 
licensed to overbuild in only five counties.  (App. at 3640 
(Williams Dec.); App. at 4284-85 (Singer Reply Dec.).)  
                                              
29
 Or, at least, he screens for overbuilders, DBS 
providers, and a single incumbent provider – Comcast.  I have 
already identified, supra Part II(A)(3), why he should instead 
screen for incumbent share. 
30
 Dr. Besen, one of Comcast‟s experts, reports that 
there are 649 unique franchise areas in the Philadelphia 
DMA.  (App. at 3782 (Besen Reply Dec.).) 
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While Plaintiffs‟ experts have opined that, had RCN 
successfully overbuilt those five counties, it would have 
continued overbuilding elsewhere, (App. at 4284-85 (Singer 
Reply Dec.)), any overbuilding into the other parts of the 
Philadelphia DMA would, it seems clear, have come later 
than the overbuilding of the five licensed counties.  Thus, 
while some franchise areas might have been overbuilt early in 
the class period, other franchise areas would likely never have 
been overbuilt at all or have been overbuilt only later in the 
class period.  There might, for instance, in the “but for” world 
be some franchise areas that were 50 percent overbuilt for the 
entire class period and other franchise areas that were only 5 
percent overbuilt and only for a single year, or perhaps not 
overbuilt at all.  That means that, both throughout the 
Philadelphia DMA and throughout the class period, there 
would probably be very significant variation in the “but for” 
level of overbuilding from franchise area to franchise area.   
 
 Consider next DBS penetration.  Dr. McClave testified 
that the DBS penetration rate he used for the Philadelphia 
DMA was an average for the DMA, but he also said that it 
was his understanding that “DBS penetration varies across the 
cluster here” and that it was “possible that some of the 
counties in the Philadelphia DMA in fact have penetration 
that‟s above the national median.”  (App. at 729-30 (McClave 
Cross).)  Thus, according to Dr. McClave, not only does DBS 
penetration vary across the Philadelphia DMA, but the 
variation is pronounced enough that some parts of the 
Philadelphia DMA have above national average DBS 
penetration despite the fact that the Philadelphia DMA, as a 
whole, has DBS penetration at only half the national average.  
Because DBS penetration was unaffected by Comcast‟s 
alleged anti-competitive conduct, see supra Part II(A)(2), 
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DBS penetration in the “but for” Philadelphia DMA would 
likewise vary significantly from one franchise area to another. 
 
Finally, with respect to the incumbents‟ market share, 
the record gives little information regarding what the share of 
any non-Comcast incumbent would be in the “but for” world.  
We do know, though, that Comcast‟s share prior to clustering 
varied markedly from franchise area to franchise area.  (See, 
e.g., App. at 3833 (Chipty Dec.) (stating that Comcast “had a 
zero percent share of housing units in the majority of 
counties” and, therefore, that “Comcast‟s share in the 
counties in which it was present was substantially higher than 
[its average market share]”); App. at 733 (McClave Cross) 
(testifying that, at the beginning of the class period, Comcast 
was present in “maybe half, maybe less of the counties” and 
that its share “in the counties where [it was] present” was 
probably higher than its average share)).  And, where the 
other two components of market share – DBS penetration and 
overbuilding
31
 – vary from one franchise area to another, it 
becomes a near mathematical certainty that the remaining 
portion of the franchise held by incumbent cable providers 
must likewise vary.
32
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 While there may be other “alternative delivery 
systems” that have a limited share of the market, Dr. 
McClave includes those providers in his DBS penetration 
screen, see supra note 21, and they are, therefore, accounted 
for. 
32
 It is possible, of course, that the variation in DBS 
and overbuilder shares could be such that the combined total 
of the two is the same in different franchise areas, and, 
therefore, it is not a true mathematical certainty that 
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The wide variation in the relative market shares 
evidenced by the record makes it hard to imagine a means of 
calculating class-wide damages.  Even if Dr. McClave‟s 
benchmarks were not problematic, to say that Comcast‟s “but 
for” share of the market throughout the Philadelphia DMA 
would be, on average, 40% is about as meaningful as saying 
that “with one foot on fire and the other on ice, I am, on 
average, comfortable.”33  Given that the three major factors 
identified as influencing price – overbuilding, DBS 
penetration, and incumbent share – vary widely within the 
franchise areas across the DMA, and given further that 
Comcast prices its cable service at the franchise level, (see 
App. at 716), I have difficulty accepting that it is appropriate 
to ignore those differences and take an average across the 
counties of the DMA.
34
 
                                                                                                     
incumbent share must also vary.  That that would occur 
across the 650 franchise areas, however, seems implausible in 
the extreme. 
33
 Sometimes attributed to Mark Twain, the actual 
source of this quote is unknown. 
34
 The Majority asserts that “concern over using 
mathematical averages across the Philadelphia DMA … is 
notably absent from Comcast‟s briefing ….”  (Slip Op. at 53-
54 n.18.)  But it is not absent.  In fact, Comcast criticizes Dr. 
McClave‟s screens by explaining that: 
 
prior to the Transactions[,] Comcast did not 
operate in the majority of franchise areas in the 
DMA.  By contrast, in the franchise areas where 
Comcast did operate, it is undisputed that 
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This primary flaw in Dr. McClave‟s methodology – 
using a single set of assumptions for the entire Philadelphia 
DMA – cannot be fixed merely by altering his model.  It 
seems to me that no model can calculate class-wide damages 
because any damages – such as they may be – are not 
distributed on anything like a similar basis throughout the 
DMA.
35
  Rather, where some class members might reside in a 
                                                                                                     
Comcast‟s market share was significantly 
higher than 40%.  Thus, the pre-class “20%” 
market share Dr. McClave employed in the 
creation of his screen is a mirage, arrived at 
solely through the artifice of averaging 
Comcast‟s greater-than-40% share of markets 
where it did operate with its “0% share” in 
hundreds of markets where it was not even 
present. 
  
(Appellants Br. at 43.)  That criticism precisely mirrors my 
own.  Because of the significant variation in the market 
makeup from franchise area to franchise area, DMA-wide 
averages are not reliable.  See also infra n.35. 
35
 This is not simply a case where there might be some 
variation in the amount of damages from one class member to 
another that can be ignored in order to gain the benefit of 
class treatment.  Instead, due to the wide variations in the 
market makeup of the franchise areas across the DMA, 
proving damages will require some factual inquiry into the 
relative market shares of overbuilders, DBS providers, and 
incumbents in individual franchise areas (or perhaps, as 
subsequently noted in this dissent, groups of franchise areas).  
The Majority, quoting Wright‟s Federal Practice and 
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franchise area that would have been 50 percent overbuilt for 
the entire class period and other class members might reside 
in a franchise area that would have been only 5 percent 
overbuilt and only for a single year, or not overbuilt at all, it 
strains credulity to believe that the damages suffered by those 
individuals would all be the same as a result of reduced 
overbuilding.  Yet Dr. McClave‟s model treats them as 
though they are the same,
36
 as would any model attempting to 
calculate damages on an average class-wide basis. 
                                                                                                     
Procedure, suggests that those differences in damages should 
not affect the certification process because “„it uniformly has 
been held that differences among the members as to the 
amount of damages incurred does not mean that a class action 
would be inappropriate.‟”  (Slip. Op. at 45-46 (quoting 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1781 (3d ed. 2005)).)  I agree with the quoted 
statement, but would point also to the following quote from 
the same treatise: “Rather, the question of damages can be 
severed from that of liability and tried on an individual basis.”  
Id.  Thus, neither Wright – nor any authority I can find – 
suggests that where there are wide differences in damages 
from one class member to another, those differences can be 
ignored.  Wright suggests instead that those differences can 
be accounted for by considering liability on a class-wide basis 
but damages on a more individualized basis – consistent with 
what I propose. 
36
 I recognize that Dr. McClave‟s model does not treat 
all franchise areas exactly the same, because he uses actual 
prices on a county-by-county level and, as a result, calculates 
a separate “but for” price for each county.  (App. at 3424-26 
(McClave Dec.).)  But, while he uses actual prices on a 
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The variation in conditions within the nearly 650 
franchise areas in the Philadelphia DMA means that the issue 
of damages is more fractured than a single class can 
accommodate.  I do not suggest that there necessarily would 
need to be 650 subclasses.  It may well be that subclasses 
could be created encompassing groups of multiple franchise 
areas having similar demographics.  See, e.g., Eisen v. 
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 566 (2d Cir. 1968) 
(explaining that where “differences among the class members 
                                                                                                     
county-by-county level, he calculates the “but for” prices 
using the same benchmark counties for the entire Philadelphia 
DMA (again, excepting Lehigh and Northampton, where 
Comcast has no presence).  He treats the DMA as though the 
“but for” conditions would have been the same throughout.   
The Majority states that this criticism “overstates the 
degree of dissimilarity among the franchise areas” because I 
fail to note that “[m]any franchise areas within counties often 
have identical or nearly identical pricing.”  (Slip Op. at 54 
n.18 (quoting App. 3409 (McClave Dec.).)  It may well be 
that there are similarities allowing for grouping of franchise 
areas, as I note in suggesting the possibility of subclasses.  
More fundamentally, however, the problem with Dr. 
McClave‟s opinion is not that it fails to account for variations 
in actual prices in the Philadelphia DMA, but that it fails to 
account for variations in the “but for” conditions that would 
have existed within the Philadelphia DMA.  By so doing, the 
model is unable to distinguish between persons living in areas 
that may have been highly overbuilt and who, thus, would 
have suffered substantial damages, and persons living in areas 
that may never have been overbuilt and who, thus, would 
have suffered no damages. 
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bear only on the computation of damages,” it “can be 
adequately handled … [by] divid[ing] the class into 
appropriate subclasses”).  Whether that would necessitate the 
creation of so many subclasses as to defeat the benefit of class 
treatment is something I do not venture to conclude on this 
record.  But I would remand the case to the District Court for 
consideration of the feasibility of subclasses. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, I would vacate the District 
Court‟s certification order to the extent it provides for a single 
class as to proof of damages and remand the case for the 
District Court to address whether Dr. McClave‟s model 
could, in fairness, be revised to accurately reflect the 
conditions that would have existed in the Philadelphia DMA 
in the absence of any reduction in overbuilding caused by 
clustering.  I would further ask the District Court to consider 
whether the class certified for proving antitrust impact can be 
divided into appropriate subclasses for purposes of proving 
damages. 
